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Vestal

THE LINGERING BIGOTRY OF STATE
CONSTITUTION RELIGIOUS TESTS
Allan W. Vestal

INTRODUCTION
In her Town of Greece dissent Justice Elena Kagan describes
the position of a citizen who does not conform to state-sponsored
religious practice:
. . . she becomes a different kind of citizen, one who
will not join in the religious practice that the Town
Board has chosen as reflecting its own and the
community’s most cherished beliefs. And she thus
stands at a remove, based solely on religion, from her
fellow citizens and her elected representatives.1
In Justice Kagan’s example, a Muslim citizen wishes to appear
before the town board. Before she appears “a minister deputized by
the Town asks her to pray ‘in the name of God’s only son Jesus
Christ.’”2 Given the evident connection between Christian worship
and the board,3 she faces a choice:
. . . to pray alongside the majority as one of that group
or somehow to register her deeply felt difference. She is
a strong person, but that is no easy call—especially
given that the room is small and her every action (or
inaction) will be noticed. She does not wish to be rude
to her neighbors, nor does she wish to aggravate the
Board members whom she will soon be trying to
persuade. And yet she does not want to acknowledge

© 2015 Allan W. Vestal.

Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
1
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1850 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
2
Id.
3
Id. (“She must think—it is hardly paranoia, but only the truth—that Christian
worship has become entwined with local governance.”).

Vestal

56

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 15:1

Christ’s divinity, any more than many of her
neighbors would want to deny that tenet.4
If she chooses an option consistent with her religious beliefs –
declining to participate in the Christian prayer or standing up and
leaving the room – the citizen of Muslim faith is forced to stand at a
remove from her fellow citizens.
Over the course of our national history citizens have often been
forced to stand at a remove based on religious belief. One mechanism
has been through our most basic laws; from the Revolution to the
present day, citizens have been set apart based on their religious
beliefs by virtue of provisions in our state constitutions.
One way in which state constitutions have placed Catholics,
Jews and non-believers apart at various times in our national history
has been through religious tests for public office. Typically these tests
were straightforward. For example, the Mississippi constitution of
1890 provided: “No person who denies the existence of a Supreme
Being shall hold any office in this state.”5 Eight states retain these
provisions in their current constitutions.6
A second way in which state constitutions have placed groups
disfavored on grounds of religious belief at a remove has been through
religious tests for testimonial competency. Less common in state
constitutions than religious tests for public office, these provisions
were equally straightforward. For example, the Arkansas constitution
of 1874 provided: “No person who denies the being of a God shall . . .

4

Id.
See infra app. A.5.e. In contrast, eight states had constitutional provisions barring
all clergymen from office, none of which survived the 19 th Century. See DEL.
CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1838,
art. VI, § 10; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXII; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 18; KY.
CONST. of 1800, art. II, § 26; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 11; MISS. CONST. of
1817, art. VI, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, §
4; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 23. The clauses were removed in these eights states
with adoptions of subsequent constitutions. See DEL. CONST. of 1831; FLA. CONST.
of 1865; GA. CONST. of 1798; KY. CONST. of 1850; MD. CONST. of 1864; MISS.
CONST. of 1832; N.Y. CONST. of 1846; S.C. CONST. of 1895.
6
See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 5.e, 7.e, 8.e, 9.a, 10.c, 11.a.
5
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be competent to testify as a witness in any court.”7 Two states retain
these provisions in their current constitutions.8
The following discussion turns first to religious tests for public
office, then to religious tests for testimonial competence,10 looking at
both in terms of their history and contemporary status. Following we
discuss some public policy reasons these state constitutional religious
tests should be of concern.11 The conclusion proposes a course of
action.12
9

As we shall see, the importance of these state constitutional
provisions has always been in their symbolism, not in their day-to-day
impact on who served in public positions or who testified in court.
But their symbolic importance has been significant. Through such
provisions certain of our state constitutions affirmed that, based solely
on religious belief, some citizens were unworthy to serve in public
capacities and undeserving to be believed in judicial proceedings.
These state constitutional provisions unfairly placed some of our
fellow citizens at a substantial remove from the rest of society.

7

ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § 1.
See infra apps. C.1.c & 2.c.
9
See infra Part I.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part IV.
8
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I. RELIGIOUS TESTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
If you’re an atheist and don’t believe in God and still
want to hold office, I have a problem with that. And the
constitution of North Carolina has a problem with that.
H.K. Edgerton13
In the fall of 2009, H.K. Edgerton had a cause.14 Cecil
Bothwell was running for the Asheville, North Carolina city council.
Edgerton opposed Bothwell, and thought him ineligible to serve. For
Cecil Bothwell did not “believe in supernatural beings of any stripe,”15
and the North Carolina constitution barred from office “any person
who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”16
Bothwell won the election and was sworn in as a member of

13

David Zucchino, Councilman Under Fire for Atheism, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/20/nation/la-na-hometown-asheville202009dec20.
14
H.K. Edgerton does not give up on lost causes. An African-American, he is
known as a “Southern heritage activist.” Stephanie McNeal, Unenforceable Ban on
Atheists Holding Public Office Still on the Books in 8 States, FOX NEWS (July 16,
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/16/states-atheists-banned-publicoffice/. He describes himself as being:
[A] black Confederate activist who works tirelessly to bring the
real truth of our heritage to people of all races. [He] has walked
thousands of miles carrying his large Confederate Battle Flag
through cities and towns and down country roads. He speaks at
venues all over the South exposing the many myths of Yankee
history and setting the record straight regarding [the] black role in
the history of the South.
Southern Heritage 411, SOUTHERNHERITAGE411.COM,
http://www.southernheritage411.com/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
15
Rob Boston, North Carolina Politicians Seek to Unseat Councilman Because He’s
an Atheist, ALTERNET (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://www.alternet.org/story/145501/north_carolina_politicians_seek_to_unseat_co
uncilman_because_he's_an_atheist (quoting CECIL BOTHWELL, THE PRINCE OF WAR:
BILLY GRAHAM’S CRUSADE FOR A WHOLLY CHRISTIAN EMPIRE (1st ed. 2007)). He
is variously described by others as an “atheist,” a “post-theist,” “Satan’s helper,” a
“radical extremist,” and is a member of the Unitarian Universalist Church.
Zucchino, supra note 13.
16
N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8.
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the Asheville city council. Edgerton threatened litigation but did not
follow through. What if the issue had been joined? Would Bothwell
have been barred from service? The answer is found in the earlier
experiences of Roy Torcaso, a bookkeeper from Maryland, and Herb
Silverman, a math professor from South Carolina.
Roy Torcaso was in most respects an unexceptional man. Born
in 1910 into a farm family in Washington state, he served in the Army
in both World War II and Korea. A bookkeeper by training, he
worked a series of mundane jobs and died in 2007.17 The exceptional
chapter of Roy Torcaso’s life began in 1959. Employed by a
Maryland construction company, at his employer’s suggestion Roy
applied to become a notary public. His application was denied
because he refused to swear to a state mandated oath that affirmed the
existence of God. For Roy, the son of a Catholic father and a
Protestant mother, was an atheist and in 1959 Maryland had a
constitutional provision that imposed a religious test for state office
holders: “That no religious test ought ever to be required as a
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God . . .”18
Over thirty years later Herb Silverman applied to be a notary
public in South Carolina. His application was rejected because he
struck through the portion of the required oath that read “So help me
God.”19 For Herb was an atheist20 and in 1992 South Carolina had a
constitutional provision that imposed a religious test for state office

17

Adam Bernstein, Roy Torcaso, 96; Defeated Md. In 1961 Religious Freedom
Case, WASH. POST (June 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/20/AR2007062002276.html.
18
See infra app. A.3.c (emphasis added). The provision remains in the Maryland
constitution to this day. See MD. CONST. art. XXXVII.
19
Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 1 (S.C. 1997).
20
A self-described “mild-mannered mathematics professor and liberal, Jewish,
Yankee atheist,” Silverman ran for Governor of South Carolina in 1990 and in his
book, Candidate Without a Prayer, Silverman described his experiences. Herb
Silverman The Unflappable Atheist, HERB SILVERMAN,
http://www.herbsilverman.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Silverman’s lawsuit,
brought on behalf of those who wish to run for state office and who deny the
existence of a supreme being, based on ripeness. Silverman v. Ellisor, No. 91-1022,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18506, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991).
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holders: “No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being
shall hold any office under this Constitution.”21
The situation in which Cecil Bothwell, Roy Torcaso and Herb
Silverman found themselves was not unusual. Twelve states have had
religious tests for office in their state constitutions: Arkansas,
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Vermont.22
There was variation in the formulation of the state constitution
religious tests. The narrowest, adopted by three states, permitted only
Protestant Christians to hold office, excluding Catholics, Jews, and
non-believers.23 Thus there was a time when – based solely on their
respective religious beliefs – no current member of the Supreme Court
could have been an elected official in New Jersey, North Carolina, or
Vermont.24
A number of broader formulations moved Catholics into
favored status by permitting Christians to hold office. These broader
formulations included the four states which required an affirmation of
the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments,25 the three
states which required a declaration of belief in the “Christian
religion,”26 and the state that required a profession of “faith in God the

21

Actually, the provision appeared twice in the South Carolina constitution. S.C.
CONST. of 1895, art. VI, § 2 (“No person who denies the existence of a Supreme
Being shall hold any office under this Constitution.”); S.C. CONST. of 1895, art.
XVII, § 4 (“No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any
office under this Constitution.”). The provisions remain in the South Carolina
constitution to this day. See S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 4.
22
See infra app. A.
23
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont required a declaration of faith in the
protestant religion. See infra apps. A.6.a, 7.a, 12.a, 12.b.
24
See infra apps. A.6.a, 7.a, 12.a. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy,
Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas are Catholic; Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan
are Jewish.
25
Delaware, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont required an affirmation of
the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. See infra apps. A.2.a, 7.a,
7.b, 7.c, 8.a, 12.a, 12.b.
26
Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont required a declaration of faith in the
Christian religion. See infra apps. A.3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 7.b.
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Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, One
God, blessed for evermore.”27
A broader formulation moved Jews into favored status:28 four
states required an affirmation of belief in a “future state of rewards and
punishments.”29 The broadest set of formulations, which excluded
only non-believers,30 was adopted by ten states.31 These included a
requirement that the office holder declare a belief in God32 or a
supreme being,33 or in the alternative an exclusion of those who denied
the existence of God34 or a supreme being.35
Although not uncommon, state constitution religious tests for
office have not dominated the national landscape. Thirty-two states
have had prohibitions on religious tests in their state constitutions.36

27

Delaware had this formulation. See infra app. A.2.a.
The Maryland Constitution of 1851 having first required “a declaration of belief in
the Christian religion,” it subsequently provided that “if the party shall profess to be
a Jew, the declaration shall be of his belief in a future state of rewards and
punishments.” See infra app. A.3.a.
29
Maryland, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and Tennessee required an affirmation of
belief in a future state of rewards and punishments. See infra apps. A.3.b, 5.a, 5.b,
5.d, 5.e, 8.b, 8.c, 8.d, 8.e, 10.a, 10.c.
30
This discussion uses the term non-believer, not atheist or agnostic, because the
typical religious tests are cast in terms of belief in a God or a Supreme Being. Such
a formulation includes atheists and agnostics, but it also includes believers in faith
traditions that do not have a God or Supreme Being. Schowgurow v. State, 213
A.2d 475, 478 (Md. 1965) (“[T]he Buddhist religion . . . does not teach a belief in
the existence of God or a Supreme Being.”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495
n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”).
31
Ten states – Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont – adopted one or more of
these formulations. See infra notes 32–35.
32
See infra apps. A.2.a, 3.b, 8.a, 8.b, 8.c, 8.d, 8.e, 12.a, 12.b.
33
See infra app. A.11.a.
34
See infra apps. A.1.a, 1.b, 1.d, 5.a, 5.b, 7.a, 7.b, 7.c, 7.d, 7.e, 10.a, and 10.c. In
addition, North Carolina excluded from office individuals “who shall hold religious
principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State . . . .” See infra
apps. A.7.a, 7.b, 7.c.
35
See infra apps. A.5.d, 5.e, 9.a.
36
They are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
28
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There is a clear historical trend away from state constitutional
religious tests for office. While a handful of states had religious tests
for office in their state constitutions from the revolution, the first state
constitution prohibition of such tests did not appear until 1792. 37 The
number of states with such tests exceeded the number with
prohibitions until 1820, when the count stood at six with tests and six
with prohibitions. But the next year, 1821, the number of state
constitution prohibitions exceeded the number of state constitution
tests, and that relationship has grown substantially over the following
one-hundred and ninety-three years.38 Indeed, while sixteen states
adopted constitutional prohibitions on religious tests prior to 1850,
only two states adopted constitutional religious tests in the 20th
Century.39
Today, eight states retain religious tests for public office in
their constitutions: Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.40 In form, these
contemporary state constitution religious tests for office are
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra app. B.
37
Delaware wins the prize for being the first adopter both of a religious test, in 1776,
and a prohibition on religious tests, in 1792. See infra apps. A.2.a & B.5.a
38
The delta between the number of states with constitutional prohibitions and the
number with religious tests for office has grown steadily, especially if one corrects
for the 1860s oddities in state constitutions of states engaged in the rebellion. Even
without correcting for the rebellion, grouping the years into decades produces the
following average deltas:
1820s
1830s
1840s
1850s
39

1.8
4.1
7.4
9.7

1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s

14.0
11.9
10.4
13.4

1900s
1910s
1920s
1930s

13.0
17.7
14.0
14.0

1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s

14.0
14.0
14.0
15.6

1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

16.4
17.0
17.0
17.0

The sixteen states which adopted constitutional prohibitions on religious tests prior
to 1850 were Delaware (1792), Ohio (1802), Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818),
Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), Missouri (1820), New York (1821), Virginia (1830),
Michigan (1835), Tennessee (1835), New Jersey (1844), Texas (1845), Iowa (1846),
Wisconsin (1848), and California (1849). See infra apps. B.1.a, 4.a, 5.a, 7.a, 8.a, 9.a,
12.a, 13.a, 15.a, 18.a, 19.a, 21.a, 25.a, 26.a, 28.a, 31.a. The two states which adopted
constitutional religious tests in the 20th Century were Pennsylvania (1968) and North
Carolina (1971). See infra apps. A. 7.e & 8.e.
40
See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 5.e, 7.e, 8.e, 9.a, 10.c, 11.a.
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straightforward. Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee require a belief in God;41 Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Texas require a belief in a Supreme Being.42 Pennsylvania and
Tennessee add language relating to belief in a future state of rewards
and punishments.43 On the other side, twenty-six states retain
prohibitions on religious tests in their current constitutions.44
Both Roy Torcaso and Herb Silverman litigated the state
constitution religious tests that kept them from becoming notary
publics. Torcaso challenged the Maryland provision before the
Maryland Court of Appeals on First Amendment grounds.45 The
Maryland Court of Appeals rejected Torcaso’s challenge, predicting
that the United States Supreme Court would not invalidate the
religious test for office:
In the absence of any direct authority on the point, we
find it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court will
hold that a declaration of belief in the existence of God,
required by Article 37 of our Declaration of Rights as a
qualification for State office, is discriminatory and
invalid. As Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a
majority of the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.

41

See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 7.e, 8.e, 10.c.
See infra apps. A.5.e, 9.a, 11.a.
43
See infra apps. A.8.e & 10.c.
44
They are Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra apps. B.1.e, 2.a,
4.b, 5.c, 6.g, 8.b, 9.b, 10.a, 12.a, 13.d, 14.a, 15.d, 16.a, 17.a, 18.b, 20.a, 21.b, 22.a,
23.a, 24.a, 27.a, 28.b, 29.a, 30.c, 31.a, 32.a.
45
Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438, 442 (Md. 1960) (“The appellant contends, in
effect, that the State Constitutional qualification deprives him of his ‘liberty’ to
disbelieve in God, and discriminates against him as a nonbeliever.”). Torcaso did not
seek to invalidate the Maryland provision on the basis of the direct application of the
Federal Constitution’s Article VI prohibition on religious tests for office. See id.
(“The appellant does not contend that clause three of Art. VI of the Federal
Constitution is applicable to the states. That clause, providing that ‘no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States,’ is plainly inapplicable.”). Nor did he claim the Article VI prohibition
was applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (“Nor is it contended
that this clause could be imported into the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
42
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306, 313, said: “We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”46
The Maryland court based its prediction, in part, on the
existence of a related type of discrimination against non-believers: the
exclusion of their testimony as incompetent.
The problem here is more basic than in any of the cases
cited. An oath, predicated upon a belief in God, is a
regular incident of judicial proceedings. There can be
no doubt that at common law an atheist was
incompetent as a witness. There has been
no constitutional or statutory abrogation of the common
law rule in this State.47
The Maryland court ultimately found itself essentially arguing
that the bigotry written into its constitution was justified:
To the members of the Convention, as to the voters
who adopted our Constitution, belief in God was
equated with a belief in moral accountability and the
sanctity of an oath. We may assume that there may be
permissible differences in the individual's conception of
God. But it seems clear that under our Constitution
disbelief in a Supreme Being, and the denial of any
moral accountability for conduct, not only renders a
person incompetent to hold public office, but to give
testimony, or serve as a juror.48
Of course, equating disbelief in a supreme being with the
denial of any moral accountability is a stunningly ignorant position.
The court was reduced to arguing that “we cannot say that the
distinction between believers and non-believers is so patently
inappropriate as a security for good conduct, as to make it invidious
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”49

46

Id. at 443.
Id. (citations omitted).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 444.
47
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The Maryland Court of Appeals could not have been more
wrong in its prediction of how the Unites States Supreme Court would
rule. Writing for the Court, Justice Black found that the Maryland
constitutional provision “sets up a religious test which was designed to
and, if valid, does bar every person who refuses to declare a belief in
God from holding a public ‘office of profit or trust’ in Maryland.”50
Justice Black noted “that there is much historical precedent for such
laws.”51
Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and
declarations that a great many of the early colonists left
Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own
way. It soon developed, however, that many of those
who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to
be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so,
to force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in
conformity with that faith. This brought on a host of
laws in the new Colonies imposing burdens and
disabilities of various kinds upon varied beliefs
depending largely upon what group happened to be
politically strong enough to legislate in favor of its own
beliefs. The effect of all this was the formal or
practical “establishment” of particular religious faiths
in most of the Colonies, with consequent burdens
imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored
believers.52
Having noted an earlier pronouncement by the Court that “the
test oath is abhorrent to our tradition,”53 Justice Black quoted at length
from Everson v. Board of Education:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can

50

Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489–90.
Id. at 490.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 491 (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)).
51
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pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. . . .
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
“a wall of separation between church and State.”54
Finally, Justice Black rejected the argument that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zorach required a different result: “Nothing
decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court
there intended to open up the way for government, state or federal, to
restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of
probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to
persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief
in some particular kind of religious concept.”55
The Torcaso Court’s conclusion was clear:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”
Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions

54

Id. at 492–93 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–6 (1947)). Justice
Black also quotes Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) joined in by the other dissenters in Everson:
“We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach
far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an
‘established church’ . . . . We renew our conviction that ‘we have staked the very
existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion.’” Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 493–94.
55
Id. at 494.

Vestal

2015]

LINGERING BIGOTRY

67

founded on different beliefs.56
Thirty years after Torcaso, Herb Silverman challenged the
state constitution religious test that kept him from becoming a notary
public.57 The trial court found two provisions of the South Carolina
constitution to violate both the First Amendment and the Religious
Test Clause of the Federal Constitution.58 The South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court holding.59
Other state constitutional religious tests for office have been
challenged. The Texas constitutional provision was challenged in
Federal court in the early 1980s.60 The Fifth Circuit allowed some of
the claims to go forward and, although it did not decide on the merits,
indicated that “it is difficult to distinguish this case from Torcaso v.
Watkins . . .” and quoted from the Torcaso opinion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”
Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a

56

Id. at 495. Torcaso was decided on the basis of the First Amendment; the Court
did not reach the claim that the Maryland oath violated the ban on religious tests
under Article VI. Id. at 489 n.1. (“Appellant also claimed that the State’s test oath
requirement violates the provision of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution that ‘no
religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States.’ Because we are reversing the judgment on other grounds,
we find it unnecessary to consider appellant’s contention that this provision applies
to state as well as federal offices.”).
57
Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 1997).
58
Id.
59
Id. The Silverman court cites Torcaso for the proposition that the “Maryland
Constitution’s Supreme Being Clause violates First Amendment and Religious Test
Clause.” Id. (citing Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). This is in error, as the Torcaso
opinion did not reach the question of whether the Maryland provision violated the
Article VI religious test provision. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.1.
60
O’Hair v. Hill, 641 F.2d 307, 309–313 (5th Cir. 1981), reh’g granted O’Hair v.
White, 675 F.2d 680 (5th Cir., 1982) (dismissing the case without expressing an
opinion as to the constitutionality of the Texas religious test provision),
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belief in the existence of God as against those religions
rounded on different beliefs.61
The Mississippi constitutional provision62 was challenged in
Federal court in the mid-1980s.63 As to standing and the substantive
analysis, the Mississippi district court noted the Fifth Circuit analysis
in O’Hare v. White. The district court also noted the Torcaso v.
Watkins decision: “it is clear that under the analysis of the Supreme
Court in Torcaso v. Watkins . . . that this provision of the Mississippi
State Constitution is constitutionally infirm.”64
The Arkansas constitutional provision65 was challenged in
Federal court in the early 1980s upon the theory that the provision was
a bill of attainder and violated the establishment clause of the First
Amendment.66 The district court dismissed the claim on standing
based on the lack of an actual or threatened injury. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, but stated in a footnote: “Although we do not reach the
merits of appellants’ constitutional claim given the procedural posture
of this case, we note that the challenged section would appear to be
inconsistent with Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”67 Ten years later the
Attorney General of Arkansas, relying on the Eighth Circuit’s footnote
in Flora v. White and the Supreme Court holding in Torcaso, issued an
opinion “that if a plaintiff with proper standing brings a claim that is
ripe for adjudication, art. 19, §1 will most likely be declared
unconstitutional.”68 The Arkansas constitutional provision has also
been the subject of commentary in the Arkansas Law Review.69

61

White, 675 F.2d at 696 n.34 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495).
MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XIV, § 265 (“No person who denies the existence of a
Supreme Being shall hold any office in this state.”).
63
See Tirmenstein v. Allain, 607 F.Supp. 1145 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
64
Id. at 1146 (citations omitted).
65
See infra app. A.1.d (“No person who denies the being of a God shall hold any
office in the civil departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a witness
in any court.”).
66
Flora v. White, 692 F.2d 53, 54 (8th Cir. 1982).
67
Id. at 54 n.2.
68
Letter from Winston Bryant, Attorney Gen., Opinion No. 92-164 (June 30, 1992).
Attorney General Bryant referred in his opinion letter to both the religious test
language of Article 6 and the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See id.
69
Seth R. Jewell, Disqualification of Atheists: Punishment for Nonbelievers in
Arkansas, 64 ARK. L. REV. 409, 409 (2011).
62
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Noting potential Constitutional challenges based on the First
Amendment,70 the religious test clause of Article 6,71 the due process
clause,72 the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,73
and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,74 the author
concluded that “[i]f article XIX, section 1 was subject to a valid
constitutional challenge, the provision would undoubtedly be held
unconstitutional, and Arkansas would face severe embarrassment and
damaging ridicule.”75
And what of the North Carolina constitutional religious test for
office, under which H.K. Edgerton sought to prevent Cecil Bothwell
from serving on the Asheville city council? Although apparently
neither Edgerton nor Bothwell knew it, almost forty years before
Bothwell’s election the office of the North Carolina Attorney General
had opined that the religious test for public office in the North
Carolina constitution is unenforceable.76 Citing and quoting from
Torcaso, the opinion concluded:
In the light of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the portion of Article VI, Section 8, of
the North Carolina Constitution, which disqualifies for
office any person who shall deny the being of Almighty

70

Id. at 418–422.
Id. at 422–24. While the author acknowledges that the Torcaso court “did not
explicitly address Article VI, Section 3” he asserts that “it effectively upheld its
purpose” and suggests that as Article XIX, §1 of the Arkansas constitution “violates
these specific purposes” it is unconstitutional. Id. at 423. The author does not address
the language of the religious test clause of Article VI being limited to “any Office or
public Trust under the United States.” See id.
72
Id. at 424–25.
73
Id. at 426.
74
Id. at 427. The Confrontation Clause argument is perhaps not the strongest. If the
excluded non-believer is an adverse witness it is true the defendant will be denied
the right to confront. But the exclusion of the atheist witness means her adverse
testimony will be excluded. The defendant is thus advantaged by the
unconstitutional exclusion. If the excluded non-believer is favorable, the defendant
is indeed disadvantaged. But the disadvantage is less appropriately cast as a
confrontation problem – one doesn’t confront favorable witnesses – than as a due
process problem.
75
Id. at 416.
76
Robert Morgan & James F. Bullock, North Carolina Attorney General Reports, 41
N.C.A.G. 708, 730 (1972).
71
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God, violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and cannot be used to disqualify a person
from office who is otherwise qualified.77
The opinion of the North Carolina attorney general was
confirmed seven years later, thirty years before Edgerton sought
recourse to the North Carolina provision, in Federal court. The
outcome was not surprising; in 1979 a declaratory judgment was
entered pursuant to a consent decree. North Carolina agreed to not
enforce its religious test.78 As it turns out, H.K. Edgerton had backed
another lost cause. Cecil Bothwell still sits on the Asheville city
council.79
II. RELIGIOUS TESTS FOR TESTIMONIAL COMPETENCY
I am certain that there is an obligation on my
part to tell the truth when sworn; I am not certain that
there is a Supreme Being who rewards and punishes
men; I am not satisfied that it is so, and I am not
certain that it is not so; I have no belief one way or the
other.
Ira Aldrich80
In April of 1855, Ira Aldrich witnessed a train strike and
grievously injure an ox owned by one Rockafellow.81 The ox died and
Rockafellow sued the railroad. The railroad called Aldrich but the

77

Morgan & Bullock, supra note 76, at 730.
O’Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 683 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The Society [of
Separationists, Inc.] filed a similar suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina in 1979. In that case a declaratory judgment was
entered on the basis of a consent decree in which the state agreed not to enforce a
similar constitutional provision.” (citing Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Hunt, No.
CC 78-0351 (W.D.N.C. April 4, 1979))).
79
Meet City Council, ASHEVILLE, N.C.,
http://www.ashevillenc.gov/CityCouncil/MeetCityCouncil.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2015).
80
Cent. Military Tract R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 544 (1856).
81
The basis for the Rockafellow holding is the common law, Illinois having neither a
constitutional nor a statutory provision on point. The case serves to illustrate the
theory common to the various states, whether they followed the common law or had
a constitutional or statutory provision. Id. at 552.
78
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“plaintiff objected to his being sworn on account of his want of
religious belief . . . .”82 The trial court allowed an examination of
Aldrich as to his religious beliefs.
I don’t believe in the existence of a God, particularly;
can’t say whether I believe it or not . . . I don’t believe
there is a God who punishes for perjury, either in this
world or any other; I don’t believe anything about it; it
may be and it may not; I have no opinion about it. . . . I
believe I should be responsible to the civil law if I
should testify falsely; and, further, that I should be
punished by losing the esteem of my fellow men . . . .83
On the basis of Aldrich’s testimony, the trial court refused to
permit him to be sworn or to testify. Without the benefit of Aldrich’s
testimony the railroad was assessed $50 for Rockafellow’s ox.84
Two contemporary state constitutions include religious tests
for testimonial competency.85 Is it possible that, today, a witness like
Ira Aldrich would be excluded from testifying based solely on
religious belief?
The exclusion of some witnesses as incompetent based on their
religious beliefs was the common law rule. In 1215, Pope Innocent III
and the Fourth Lateran Council issued a reform decree withdrawing
the Church’s support for trial by ordeal.86 Seeking a replacement
system that would continue the fundamental characteristic of being
able to “wrap the system’s judgments in the word of God” seeing “a
substitute that would reassure the public of God’s continuing role in
meting out human justice,” led, it is asserted by Professor George
Fisher in his innovative study, to a justice system that “by staking its

82

Id. at 544.
Id.
84
Id. at 542.
85
See infra apps. C.1.c & C.2.c.
86
LATERAN IV c.18 (“Neither shall anyone in judicial tests or ordeals by hot or cold
water or hot iron bestow any blessing . . .”); Roger D. Groot, The Early-ThirteenthCentury Criminal Jury, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200–1800 3, 3 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988);
George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585, 586 (1997).
83
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verdicts on the oaths of witnesses . . . could claim that the threat of
divine vengeance assured truthful outcomes.”87
But a system that depended for “divine sanction for the
verdicts of its very human juries” on “the witness’s oath, enforced (as
it was thought to be) by the threat of divine vengeance” was
substantially challenged by testimony under oath that conflicted.88
Thus, “a broad series of witness competency rules that barred whole
categories of witnesses – those thought most likely to lie – from
testifying,” Professor Fisher argues, can be seen as “guarding against
the embarrassment of conflicting oaths” and protecting “the old
presumption that all sworn evidence was true.”89 The groups thought
“unlikely to tell the truth” included “slaves, women (in certain
circumstances), those below the age of fourteen, the insane, the
infamous, paupers, infidels, criminals, parties to the cause, children of
parties, parents of parties, servants of parties, and enemies of
parties.”90 The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 issued a reformatory
decree prohibiting “heretics” from giving testimony in court.91

87

Fisher, supra note 86, at 587, 583; Paul W. Kaufman, Disbelieving Nonbelievers:
Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century American
Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395, 402 (2003) (“[T]he oath’s ‘solemn
invocation of the vengeance of the Deity upon the witness, if he do not declare the
whole truth’ served to dissuade potential perjurers with the threat of eternal
damnation.” (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 22 (2nd
ed. 1833))).
88
Fisher, supra note 86, at 589.
89
Id. at 583–84.
90
Id. at 590 (quoting Charles Donahue, Jr., Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts
of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law, in ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN THE HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 127,
130–131 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981)).
91
LATERAN IV c.3:
We decree that those who give credence to the teachings of the
heretics, as well as those who receive, defend, and patronize them,
are excommunicated; and we firmly declare that after any one of
them has been branded with excommunication, if he has
deliberately failed to make satisfaction within a year, let him
incur ipso jure the stigma of infamy and let him not be admitted to
public offices or deliberations, and let him not take part in the
election of others to such offices or use his right to give testimony
in a court of law. . . .
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The reliance of the judicial system on the oaths of witnesses
disadvantaged religious minorities and atheists.92 “During medieval
times and the early Enlightenment, it was thought that only those who
believed in a future state of rewards and punishments, governed by the
Christian deity, could be trusted.”93
Over time there was an evolution on the exclusion of witnesses
on grounds of religious belief. While Lord Coke had asserted that
only Christians could testify upon oath, by the turn of the 19th Century
testimony upon oath was allowed non-Christians who nevertheless
believed in some type of “divine retribution for falsehoods told under
oath.”94 Thus there developed procedures by which non-Christians
could be sworn, including Jews (“on the Pentateuch with covered
heads”), “Mahometans” (upon the Koran), “Gentoos” (“touching the
foot of a Brahmin (or priest)”), Chinese (“by the ceremony of killing a
cock, or breaking a saucer, the witness declaring that, if he speaks
falsely, his soul will be similarly dealt with”), “a Scotch covenanter
and a member of the Scottish Kirk” (“by holding up the hand, without
kissing the book”), and a “Hindoo” (“by the uplifting of the hand”).95
“Quakers and others, who profess to entertain conscientious scruples
against taking an oath in the usual form, are allowed an affirmation,
i.e., a solemn religious asseveration that their testimony shall be
true.”96
But not non-believers, who remained excluded because of the
oath:

92

97

Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403 (“Reliance on the oath . . . significantly affected
religious minorities and atheists.”).
93
Id.
94
Fisher, supra note 86, at 657 & n.379 (“[N]othing but the belief of a God and that
he will reward and punish us according to our deserts is necessary to qualify a man
to take the oath.” (quoting Omichund v. Barker, Y.B. 18 Geo. 2, Hil. 1, at 545 (Ch.
1744))); Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403.
95
5 JAMES M. HENDERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
CASES § 2090, at 3914–15, 3914 n.19 (2nd ed. 1926) (referring to “Hindoo”).
96
Id. at 3915.
97
Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403 (“After Omychund, the common view was that
‘not only Jews, but infidels of any country, believing in a God who enjoins truth and
punishes falsehood, ought to be received as witnesses.’ . . . While this treatment of
religious persons was surprisingly progressive, it did little for atheists.”).
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The law is wise in requiring the highest attainable
sanction for the truth of testimony given; and is
consistent in rejecting all witnesses incapable of feeling
this sanction, or of receiving this test; whether this
incapacity arises from the imbecility of their
understanding, or from its perversity. It does not
impute guilt or blame to either. . . . The atheist is also
rejected because he, too, is incapable of realizing the
obligation of an oath, in consequence of his unbelief.
The law looks only to the fact of incapacity, not to the
cause, or the manner of avowal. Whether it be calmly
insinuated, with the elegance of Gibbon, or roared forth
in the disgusting blasphemies of Paine, still it is
atheism; and to require the mere formality of an oath,
from one, who avowedly despises, or is incapable of
feeling its peculiar sanction, would be but a mockery of
justice.98
Even if at least one English judge was not quite sure that they
existed:
. . . I am clearly of [the] opinion that such infidels (if
any such there be) who [either] do not believe a God,
or, if they do, do not think that He will either reward or
punish them in this world or in the next, cannot be
witnesses in any case or under any circumstances, for
this plain reason, because an oath cannot possibly be
any tie or obligation upon them.99
It has been suggested that the inclusion of members of nonChristian religions – but not non-believers – “may have been a
symptom more of religious tolerance than of any diminished regard for
the value of the oath.”100 But nevertheless, in “progress toward
modernity,” as one commentator observed, “this cardhouse of

98

SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 368, at 412 n.2
(1842) (quoting 1 Law Reporter 346, 347).
99
5 HENDERSON, supra note 95, § 2090, at 3914 (quoting Lord Hale, 2d vol. 279).
100
Fisher, supra note 86, at 657.
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competency rules collapsed” in the middle of the 19th Century in both
England and the United States. The theoretical underpinnings of the
general collapse of competency rules included the arguments of
Jeremy Bentham that temporal penalties for perjury were sufficient to
guarantee truthfulness, making divine retribution on the basis of an
oath unnecessary.101
While the card house of competency rules collapsed, the
exclusion of atheists lasted longer than the other exclusions. In
England, Quakers and Moravians got relief from Parliament in 1828,
conscientious objectors got some relief in 1838, and religious
objectors got further relief in 1854.102 Having failed in 1861 and
1863, proponents secured an end to the exclusion of atheist testimony
in England only in 1869.103
In the United States ending the exclusion of atheist testimony
was a matter of state decision and the states moved quite unevenly.
With adoption of its constitution of 1846, Iowa became the first state
to ban religious tests for witness competency as a matter of
constitutional law.104 New York quickly followed.105
Iowa and New York provided a model for other states to allow
testimony without regard to religious belief as a matter of
constitutional law. In all, twenty-two states have had constitutional

101

Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403–04.
Id. at 404–05.
103
Fisher, supra note 86, at 659 (citing An Act for the Further Amendment of the
Law of Evidence, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 68 § 4 (1869)); Kaufman, supra note 87, at 405.
104
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 4 (stating that “no person shall be . . . rendered
incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity, in consequence of his
opinions on the subject of religion”). An identical provision had been included in
Iowa’s 1844 constitution, which was not adopted because of a dispute with Congress
over the boundaries of the new state. See IOWA CONST. art. I, §4 (1844).
105
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Iowa and New York efforts were essentially
contemporaneous. The Iowa convention met for fifteen days in May of 1846; the
Iowa Constitution of 1846 was adopted by popular vote on August 3, 1846. The
New York convention met from June 1 to October 9, 1846; the New York
Constitution of 1846 was adopted by popular vote in November. The New York
Constitution of 1846 provides “. . . no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a
witness on account of his opinion on matters of religious belief . . . .” Id.
102
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prohibitions on religious tests for testimonial competency.106 They
are, in chronological order: Iowa (1846), New York (1846), Wisconsin
(1848), California (1849), Indiana (1851), Ohio (1851), Minnesota
(1857), Kansas (1859), Oregon (1859), Nevada (1864), Missouri
(1865), Florida (1868), Illinois (1870), Nebraska (1875), Texas
(1876), North Dakota (1889), Washington (1889), Wyoming (1889),
Utah (1895), Michigan (1908), Arizona (1912), and Alabama
(1931).107 All but Florida retain their constitutional provisions today.
Eleven states have had statutory provisions that rejected religious tests
for testimonial competency.108 An additional eight states rejected
religious tests for testimonial competency as a matter of common
law.109

106

Two additional states, Virginia and West Virginia, have constitutional provisions
that are somewhat ambiguous. VA CONST. art. I, § 16 (stating that “the General
Assembly shall not prescribe any religious test whatever . . . ”); W. VA. CONST. art.
III, §11 (stating that “[n]o religious or political test oath shall be required as a prerequisite or qualification to vote, serve as a juror, sue, plead, appeal, or pursue any
profession or employment”).
107
See infra apps. D.1.a, 2.a, 3.a, 4.a, 5.a, 6.a, 7.a, 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a, 13.a,
14.a, 15.a, 16.a, 17.a, 18.a, 19.a, 20.a [AL & IA missing from abstract].
108
Kaufman, supra note 87, at 410 n.88 (Colorado); Id. at 419 & n.154 (1886 Conn.
Pub. Acts 588) (Connecticut). Kaufman dates the Connecticut change to 1875,
apparently in error since he cites CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 19, ch. 11, § 35 (1875) as
having “carried forward [an Omychund rule that a belief in a future state of rewards
and punishments was necessary to qualify a witness] . . . .” Id.; Id. at 417 n.138
(Delaware); Id. at 413–14 (IDAHO TERRITORY COMP. & REV. LAWS § 617 (1875))
(Idaho); Id. at 414 & n.117 (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 12 (1830), confirmed in
Allan v. Guarante, 148 N.E. 461 (Mass., 1925)) (Massachusetts); Id. at 412–13 &
n.106 (MISS. REV. CODE ch. 58, 1604 (1880) (“No person shall be incompetent as a
witness because of defect of religious belief.”)) (Mississippi); Id. at 419 n.155
(LAWS OF MONT. TERRITORY, Civ. P. Act, § 444 (1872)) (Montana); Id. at 409–10
(Penn. P.L. 140 (1909)) (Pennsylvania); Id. at 420 (State v. Riddel, 96 A. 531 (R.I.,
1916) cites R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 10 (1909) for the word “oath” to include
“affirmation,” and thus the competency of atheist testimony. As the rule traces back
to at least 1822, this is taken to suggest that atheists could have testified in Rhode
Island as of that date. Id. at 420 n.161) (Rhode Island); Id. at 414 (TENN. ACTS ch.
10, § 1 (1895)) (Tennessee); and Id. at 410 n.87 (VT. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Res. No. 12
(1851) (“No person shall be deemed to be incompetent as a witness in any court,
matter, or proceeding, on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief . . .”))
(Vermont).
109
Kaufman, supra note 87, at 414–15 (Georgia); Id. at 410–11 (Kentucky); Id. at
411 (Maine); Id. at 417 n.139 (New Hampshire); Id. at 417 n.140 (New Jersey); Id.
at 415 n.123 (Oklahoma); Id. at 412 (Virginia);,Id. at 412 (West Virginia).
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By 1864, reference could be made to the almost universal
rejection among the states of witness competence bars based on
religion, this in the context of legislation which would have
guaranteed the right of blacks to testify in Federal courts:
The general practice and the tendency of opinion now
is to take away all disqualification of witnesses upon
any ground, and to leave their testimony to go to the
jury and the court for them to weigh it and do justice.
In many of our States now, even the parties to an action
are competent witnesses; and no objection in point of
law exists in nearly all the States on account of a man’s
religious sentiments. All those disqualifications have
been swept away, and we think it time to do it here in
relation to colored people, and to make them competent
witnesses in the United States courts. The courts and
the juries of course will judge of their credibility.110
In contrast, only two states, Arkansas111 and Maryland,112 have
had constitutional prohibitions on atheist testimony. Both states retain
their discriminatory provisions today.113
Arkansas has been governed by four constitutions – 1836,
1864, 1868, and 1874.114 The constitutions of 1836,115 1864,116 and
1874117 contained religious tests for testimonial competency. The
constitution of 1868, which was adopted as part of the effort to get
Arkansas readmitted to the Union after its participation in the
rebellion, did not contain a religious test for testimonial competency.

110

Fisher, supra note 86, at 680.
See infra apps. C.1.a, C.1.b, C.1.c.
112
See infra apps. C.2.a, C.2.b, C.2.c.
113
See infra apps. C.2.a, C.2.b, C.2.c.
114
Some historians speak of an Arkansas constitution of 1861. This document,
which in the main followed the 1836 constitution but changed references to “the
United States of America” to “the Confederate States of America.” This
“constitution” was not submitted to the people of Arkansas for ratification.
115
See infra app. C.1.a.
116
See infra app. C.1.b.
117
See infra app. C.1.c.
111
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But the effect of the religious tests for testimonial competency in the
Arkansas constitutions was not clear because each of the four
Arkansas constitutions also contained provisions guaranteeing that the
rights and capacities of citizens would not be diminished on account of
religious belief.118
One Arkansas academic addressed the interplay between the
religious test for testimonial competency in Article XIX, §1 and the
bar on religious tests for competency in Article II, §26.119 Dean Ralph
Barnhart noted the wide range of reasons a witness might have been
deemed incompetent under the common law, and acknowledged the
unusual record of Arkansas:
Most of these incompetencies have been abolished in
almost all jurisdictions today. Remnants of them
remain, however, and Arkansas seems to have retained
more than most of her sister jurisdictions.120
He acknowledged the exclusion of non-believers under the
common law and turned to the two Arkansas constitutional provisions
on point.121 Citing and quoting Article II, §26, Dean Barnhart sought
to place Arkansas in the mainstream of American jurisdictions:
The Arkansas constitution has somewhat contradictory
provisions with respect to religious belief as affecting
competency of witnesses. Along with the other states
of the United States, Arkansas has abolished religious

118

The constitutions of 1836 and 1864 provided “[t]hat the civil rights, privileges or
capacities of any citizen shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on account of his
religion.” ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 4; ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 4. The
constitutions of 1868 and 1874 contained specific language on religious belief and
testimonial competency. The constitution of 1868 provided “. . . nor shall any
person be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity in
consequence of his opinion upon the subject of religion . . . .” ARK. CONST. of 1868,
art. I, § 21. The constitution of 1874, which remains in place, provides: “. . . nor
shall any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious
belief . . . .” ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 26.
119
Ralph C. Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L.
REV. 377, 381 (1950).
120
Id. at 380.
121
Id. at 380–81.
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tests as a prerequisite to competency. . . . Such
provisions are found in constitutions or statutes of all
the states in one form or another.122
He then acknowledged the language of Article XIX, §1, and
observed “[t]he cases which have arisen under this last provision of
the constitution seem to be few, and those which have been reported
are those in which the competency of a challenged witness was
upheld.”123 Dean Barnhart concluded his discussion by suggesting
that the religious test for testimonial competency was unusual and
subject to criticism:
Wigmore lists Arkansas as one of three remaining
states which expressly require a theological belief in
order to be a witness. This requirement of a specific
theological belief as a prerequisite of competency is out
of line with the law elsewhere and has been the subject
of searching criticism.124
The Arkansas religious test for testimonial competency under
Article XIX, §1 has been considered by the Arkansas courts three
times.125 The 1914 case of Farrell v. State involved the murder

122

Id. at 381.
Id. (citing Mueller v. Coffman, 200 S.W. 136 (Ark. 1918); Farrell v. State, 163
S.W. 768 (Ark. 1914)).
124
Id. at 381.
125
It has also been ignored by the Supreme Court of Arkansas on one occasion,
involving an appeal by a convicted murderer who was denied the opportunity to voir
dire prospective jurors on their religious beliefs and activities. Bader v. State, 40
S.W.3d 738, 741–42 (Ark. 2001) (“The purpose of the proposed voir dire was . . . to
use peremptory strikes to remove venire-persons that appellant considered to be too
religious.”). In finding “the questions regarding religious preferences that appellant
was seeking to ask were not so plainly appropriate that we should say the trial
court’s discretion was abused,” the court noted “[t]he principle that there is a
prohibition against discrimination based on religious beliefs . . .” Id. at 741, 742.
The examples the court used to illustrate the principle display a rare sense of
whimsy:
We note that there are prohibitions against using religious tests as
a qualification for holding office, voting, or exercising the rights of
a citizen to participate fully in the instrumentalities of government.
The principles of religious freedom and the prohibition against
religious discrimination are well-grounded in this country. The
123
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prosecution of J.D. Farrell.126 The allegation was that Farrell supplied
morphine used by three individuals who attempted suicide, two of
them successfully.127 Turner, the unsuccessful suicide, was called by
the prosecution to testify.128 Defense counsel challenged Turner’s
competency, claiming that he was an atheist.129 The trial court found,
and the appellate course upheld, that Turner was competent to testify
because he wasn’t an atheist: “A written pamphlet of Mr. Turner
introduced before the court showed that he did believe in the existence
of a God . . .” The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted and applied
without analysis the religious test for testimonial competence.130
The 1918 case of Mueller v. Coffman involved a commercial
dispute in which the testimony of Coffman was essential to establish
an agreement between the parties.131 It was argued that Coffman was
incompetent to testify “because of his atheistic belief.”132 The proof
that Coffman was an atheist consisted of some published verse and his
testimony in court:
Coffman admitted the authorship of some verse, of
more or less ambiguous meaning but of atheistic trend,
which was published in the local paper, and his

United States Constitution states that “no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.” This principle is similarly articulated in Article
II, Section 26, of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that
“[n]o religious test shall ever be required of any person as a
qualification to vote or hold office, nor shall any person be
rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious
belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths
or affirmations.” Id. at 742.
The principles of religious freedom and the prohibition against religious
discrimination may be well-grounded in this nation, but they are not ubiquitous. The
Bader court ignored the Arkansas constitution provision: “No person who denies the
being of a God shall hold any office in the civil departments of this State, nor be
competent to testify as a witness in any Court.” ARK. CONST. of 1874, Art. XIX., §1.
126
163 S.W. 768, 768 (Ark. 1914).
127
Id. at 769.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 770.
131
200 S.W. 136, 136 (Ark. 1918).
132
Id.
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examination by opposing counsel indicated the absence
of a belief in “the being of a God . . . .”133
Counsel having been unsuccessful when following the
language of the constitutional provision,134 the trial judge tried a
different formulation:
The Court: Let me ask the witness a question, Mr.
Taylor. Do you believe in an omnipotent Supreme
Being, who rewards one or punishes him according to
his sins committed while here?
A. Yes, sir; in a Power; I believe we are punished
according to our acts.
Q. And that that power and disposition to punish
comes from an omnipotent Supreme Being?
A. Yes, sir.
The Court: I think, Mr. Taylor, under this showing that
the witness is competent. Let the objection to his
competency be overruled.135
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the competency ruling:
. . . [T]he witness expressed the belief that we are
punished according to our acts, and that the power and
disposition to punish comes from an omnipotent
Supreme Being. One possessing this belief is not
incompetent under section 1 of article 19 of the
Constitution of the State . . .136
In the 1982 case of Flora v. White, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal on standing grounds of a challenge to the
Arkansas religious test for testimonial competency and the religious
test for public office under Article XIX, §1 of its constitution.137
Although it did not reach the merits, the court indicated its answer to

133

Id.
See infra app. C.1.c.
135
Mueller, 200 S.W. at 136–37.
136
Id. at 137.
137
692 F.2d 53, 54 (8th Cir. 1982).
134
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the ultimate question: “. . . we note that the challenged section would
appear to be inconsistent with Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”138
It seems highly unlikely any Arkansas court would attempt to
give effect to the religious test for testimonial competency under
Article XIX, Section 1. First, the language of Article II, Section 26
seems clear. Second, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the religious test
for testimonial competency under Article XIX Section 1 is
contradicted by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Torcaso.
Third, Arkansas has adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 610, which
provides: “Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters
of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason
of their nature his credibility is impared [impaired] or enhanced.”139
There is one way in which the two Arkansas constitutional
provisions might be harmonized. One might read Article XIX, Section
1 as a threshold inquiry, excluding non-believers as incompetent.
Those potential witnesses who survived the Article XIX, Section 1
threshold inquiry – by definition believers – could not thereafter be
rendered incompetent based on religious belief because of Article II,
Section 26. Thus non-believers would be excluded under Article XIX,
Section 1, but believers could not be excluded as incompetent because
of other difference in belief. Thus the state could not exclude
Catholics as incompetent but include Baptists as competent solely over
theological differences over transubstantiation. This construction
would deny non-believers the protection of Article II, section 26,
because they have no “religious belief.” This tortured construction
requires one to classify the question “do you believe in God” as not a
test of religious belief.
As to Maryland, the courts did enforce the religious test for
witnesses.140 That ended in 1965 with the cases of Schowgurow v.

138

Id. at 54 n.2.
ARK. CT. R. 610.
140
See Arnd v. Amling, 53 Md. 192, 196 (Md. 1880). In an action for damages the
plaintiffs sought to call a witness who the defendants challenged “for want of
religious faith.” Id. The defendants offered testimony of others that the proffered
witness had said he “did not believe in God.” Id. Without hearing the witnesses, the
court swore the witness “and inquired of him whether or not he believed in God, and
that, under His dispensation, he, the said witness, would be held morally accountable
139
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State141 and State v. Madison.142 Schowgurow involved a Buddhist
who had been convicted of murder by a jury that, pursuant to the
Maryland constitutional religious test, included jurors without respect
to religious belief “provided, he believes in the existence of God.”143
The Schowgurow court noted the Maryland decision in Torcaso,144 and
the Supreme Court reversal.145
In Maryland the exclusion of certain individuals on the basis of
their religious beliefs was a practical reality, not a theoretical
possibility:
. . . [T]his Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it
is and for many years has been a widespread practice in
this State, not only for grand and petit jurors to be
questioned as to their belief in God as part of their oath,
but also for prospective jurors to be so questioned,
orally or in written interrogations, before their names
are placed on the jury lists, and that any person who
does not state his belief in God is excluded.146
The court used the Supreme Court’s holding in Torcaso to
decide the issue of religious tests for jurors:
The State does not deny that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Torcaso renders unconstitutional the long
established law of this State that expression of a belief
in the existence of God is a condition precedent to
for his acts, and punished or rewarded therefor, either in this world or in the world to
come . . . .” Id. The witness answered in the affirmative. Id. The judge then offered
the defendants an opportunity to present their testimony attacking the witness’s
statement of faith. Id. The defendants declined. Id. The appellate court cited
commentators for “the general proposition that defect of religious belief is never
presumed, and the burden of proof is on the objecting party . . . .” Id. at 198. The
court of appeals did not in any way question the constitutionality of the exclusion.
141
213 A.2d 475 (Md. 1965).
142
213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965).
143
Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 477.
144
Torcaso, 162 A.2d at 444.
145
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 496.
146
Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 479. But see Loker v. State, 233 A.2d 342, 347 (Md.
1967) (noting that the jury list was made without regard to religious beliefs of
potential jury members).
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holding public office. If, as was held by the Supreme
Court in Torcaso, a notary public cannot
constitutionally be required to demonstrate his belief in
God as a condition to taking office, it follows inevitably
that the requirement is invalid as to grand and petit
jurors, whose responsibilities to the public and to the
persons with whom they deal are far greater.147
Madison extended Schowgurow to instances where the
defendant was not of a religious belief excluded by the constitution.148
The reasoning of the Schowgurow court is consistent with the
thoughts of other courts which have referred to the Maryland
constitutional religious tests.149 Presumably, the Maryland court
would extend the analogy to witnesses, holding inevitably that the
requirement is invalid as to witnesses, whose responsibilities to the
public and to the persons with whom they deal are far greater than a
notary public.150
It should be noted that discrimination against witnesses based
on their religious beliefs is not ended by barring religious tests for
testimonial competency. Once witnesses are deemed competent
without respect to religious belief, the question shifts to whether
evidence of religious belief can be introduced to attack credibility.
Three states – Arizona, Oregon, Washington – answered this question
by adopting constitutional prohibitions on inquiries into religious

147

Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 479.
Madison, 213 A.2d at 885.
149
Murray v. Burns, 405 P.2d 309, 322 (Haw. 1965) (“While the religious test
stricken down by the Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins pertained to
qualifications under Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights for public office in
Maryland, it is obvious that the reasoning underlying the opinion and the explicit
language contained in it apply equally as well to nullify the proviso of Article 36
disqualifying atheists from jury service.”); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 190 A.2d 621, 625
(Md. 1963) (“. . . [T]he opening clause of Art. 36 appears to be no longer tenable
under Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”).
150
But see Jackson v. Garrity, 250 F.Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1965). In Jackson a pro se
defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds “that the witnesses at petitioner’s
trial were required to state their belief in God before testifying.” Id. at 2. The court’s
analysis dealt with the form of the oath, not the Maryland constitutional religious test
for witnesses. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS. art. XXXVI.
148
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belief to challenge credibility, not merely competence.151 This is the
modern rule; the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “[e]vidence
of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack
or support the witness’s credibility.”152 This rule has been adopted in
forty-five states, and the remaining states reach the same result by
alternative means.153

151

See infra app. D,2.a, 15.a, 18.a.
FED. R. EVID. 610.
153
Forty-five states (all but Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and Virginia)
have adopted versions of FED. R. EVID. 610. See ALA. R. EVID. 610; ALASKA R.
EVID. 610; ARIZ. R. EVID. 610. Arizona has also adopted a constitutional provision
on point. See infra app. D.2.a. See also ARK. R. EVID. 610; CAL. EVID. CODE §789;
COLO. R. EVID. 610; DEL. R. EVID. 610; FL. STAT. ANN. § 90.611 (2012); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-6-610 (2013); HAW. R. EVID. 610; IDAHO R. EVID. 610; ILL. EVID. R. 610;
IND. R. EVID. 610; IOWA R. EVID. 5.610; KY. R. EVID. 610 Rule 610; LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 610 (1989); ME. R. EVID. 610; MD. R. 5-610; MASS. R. EVID.. 610;
MICH. R. EVID. 610; MINN. R. EVID. 610; MISS. R. EVID. 610; MONT. R. EVID. 610;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-610 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.105 (1971); N.H. R. EVID.
610; N.J. R. EVID. 610; N.M. R. EVID. 11-610; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-610; N.D. R.
EVID. 610; OHIO R. EVID. 610; OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 2610 (2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.365 (1981). Oregon has also adopted a constitutional provision on point. See
infra app. D.15.a. See PA. R. EVID. 610; R.I. R. EVID. 610; S.C. R. EVID. 610; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-17 (2014); TENN. R. EVID. 610; TEX. R. EVID. 610; UTAH
R. EVID. 610; Vt. R. Evid. 610; WASH. R. EVID. 610. Washington has also adopted a
constitutional provision on point. See infra app. D.18.a; W.V. R. EVID. 610; Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 906.10 (2013); WYO. R. EVID. 610.
Kansas uses non-uniform language to achieve the same end. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-430 (1963) (“ Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose his or her
theological opinion or religious belief unless his or her adherence or nonadherence to
such an opinion or belief is material to an issue in the action other than that of his or
her credibility as a witness.”).
Connecticut provides by statute that no person can be disqualified as a
witness based on his or her disbelief in a supreme being. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-145 (1982) ( “[No person is] disqualified as witness because of his. . . disbelief in
existence of a supreme being . . . .”). Although Connecticut case law recognizes “a
general prohibition against cross-examination on one’s religious beliefs . . . Absent a
state constitutional provision specifically proscribing such an inquiry, questions
concerning religion are treated as evidentiary issues when the defendant seeks to
strengthen his credibility through the use of religion.” State v. Rogers, 674 A.2d
1364, 1367 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
Missouri does not have an evidence code or codified rules of evidence.
Missouri case law is that it is improper to inquire into religious belief to establish or
attack credibility. McClellan v. Owens, 74 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Mo. 1934) (“Clearly
the great weight of authority is that under constitutional provisions such as ours, the
question of a witness’s personal belief, even as to there being a God or Supreme
152
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The underlying theory as to why evidence of religious belief
ought not be admissible to establish or attack credibility was nicely put
by Justice Edgar M. Cullen of the New York Supreme Court in a
concurrence in a 1903 commercial law case, Brink v. Stratton.154 In
Brink the witness was asked “whether the witness . . . believed in the
existence of a Supreme Being who will punish false swearing . . . .”155
After the objection was overruled, the witness answered:
I do not know anything about it, I am sure. I will reply
that I am an agnostic. I have no belief on that subject at
all. I do not know anything about it.156
Justice Cullen noted the provision of the New York
Constitution of 1846 that “. . . no person shall be rendered incompetent
to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious
belief,” and stated that there was not dispute about “the competency of
an infidel or an atheist as a witness.”157 He then identified the two
approaches to credibility, the Stanbro rule which allowed evidence of
religious belief to go to credibility, and the Virginia and Kentucky rule
“that a witness cannot be interrogated as to his belief in the existence
Being, cannot be inquired into, especially of the witness himself, for the purpose of
affecting his credibility.”).
New York does not have a rule of evidence on point, but “any attempt to
discredit or otherwise penalize a witness because of his [or her] religious beliefs . . .
is improper, because those factors are irrelevant to the issue of credibility.” People
v. Caba, 66 A.D.3d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (quoting People v. Wood, 66
N.Y.2d 374, 378, 488 (1985)).
Virginia’s 2012 rules of evidence provide “the credibility of a witness may
be impeached by any party other than the one calling the witness, with any proof that
is relevant to the witness’s credibility.” VA. R. EVID. 2:607(a). The impeachment
rule specifies eight non-exclusive ways in which a witness can be impeached, none
of which relate to the witness’s religious beliefs. VA. R. EVID. 2:607(a)(i)-(viii).
Evidence going to credibility, otherwise relevant, might still be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the
likelihood of confusing or misleading the trier of fact. VA. R. EVID. 2:403.
Presumably the Virginia courts would find that evidence of religious belief is not
relevant to the credibility of a witness, or, in the alternative, would find that the
unfair prejudice of such evidence substantially outweigh its probative value.
154
68 N.E. 148, 148 (N.Y. 1903).
155
Id. at 150.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 151.
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of a Deity or a future state for the purpose of affecting his
credibility.”158
In electing between the two approaches, Justice Cullen
identified the analogy used by the Stanbro court:
The learned court in the Stanbro Case said with entire
truth that, though a witness may be competent, his
credibility may be impaired. It then argued that in
analogy to the case of a party to an action who is now a
competent witness, but whose interest in the cause goes
to his credibility, so the religious belief of a witness,
while not rendering him incompetent, might be
considered on the question of the credit to be accorded
him.159
He then challenged the Stanbro analogy:
I think the learned court was misled by a false analogy.
Interest in the subject-matter and relationship to the
parties are temporal and mundane influences which
common experience teaches us tend to bias consciously
or unconsciously the testimony of witnesses. But such
is not naturally the result of abstract religious belief.160
Having addressed the Stanbro analogy, Justice Cullen turned to
a question rarely raised in these discussions: whether religious belief is
a reliable predictor of behavior. He made reference to another New
York case in which the question was whether evidence of a deceased’s
atheist beliefs was relevant to the question of whether he committed
suicide. The trial court excluded the evidence, and was upheld by the
appellate court “on the ground that a man’s probable course of action
could not be predicated from his religious belief.”161

158

Id.
Id.
160
Id. at 151.
161
Id.
159
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Justice Cullen quoted with approval the analysis of Judge
Hunt:
In what way, and how far, do these statements of belief
operate upon the conduct of man? Is it certain that he
who believes in the eternal punishment of the
impenitent in a future world is a better observer of the
laws of his country, and more free from actual crime,
than he who denies that doctrine? Or is it certain that
he who believes in the final salvation of all men would
refrain from an offense which he would have
committed had he believed that there was no future
state? No man can answer with certainty.162
Indeed, Justice Cullen asserted that the analysis of Judge Hunt
applied with even greater force to the facts in Brink than in Gibson
because religions differ in their treatment of suicide “[b]ut I know of
no system of religion or code of ethics at any time generally prevalent
in the world that has failed to condemn falsehood, or to hold truth as a
virtue.”163
Having discussed the predictive power of the inquiry into
religious belief, Justice Cullen turned to the public policy aspects of
the question:
If, despite the constitutional enactment that no such test
of competency shall longer prevail, inquiry on the
subject is still to be made with reference to the witness’
credibility, I think we may be led into great
embarrassments.164
He made the argument that the use of evidence of religious
belief to attack credibility “necessarily fell” as part of the exclusion of
religious belief evidence to determine admissibility and qualification
for office:

162

Id.
Id. at 152.
164
Id.
163
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I think that the learned court in the Stanbro Case failed
to appreciate that when the Constitution abrogated all
disqualifications from office or civil rights the
consideration of a witness’ religious belief on the
question of his credibility necessarily fell at the same
time. On the trial of a cause, as is pointed out by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, the judge may be a skeptic
or an infidel and the juror an agnostic or an atheist.
Neither can be excluded for that reason from sitting in
judgment. Is it possible that we would uphold the
submission to a jury of a witness’ belief in Christianity
as impairing his credibility?165
Finally, Justice Cullen confronted the rationale of one of the
Stanbro judges for allowing religious belief evidence; the other judge
having stated:
I have no fears that this rule will encourage parties to
scandalize truly religious witnesses by imputations that
they profess the worst of creeds. For, so long as no
religious test shall be required for judges and jurors,
parties will be loath to cross-examine witness as to their
opinions on matters of religious belief, unless they are
well assured the opinions of the witnesses are very
obnoxious to the sentiments of citizens . . . .166
Justice Cullen argued that this is not a safeguard against abuse,
it is the danger of the practice:
That which the learned judge considered a safeguard
against the abuse of the practice, to me constitutes its
danger. Doubtless, no wise advocate will interrogate a
witness as to his religious faith unless it is obnoxious
and unpopular in the community. But that is the very
case in which the exposure of a witness’ religious belief
would probably lead to injustice. . . . [T]he principle
involved here is in itself important, and the rule

165
166

Id.
Id.
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declared by the court, in my judgment, wrong.
Unfortunately, religious animosities are easily aroused,
and we should not give sanction to a principle that may
hereafter work great injustice.167
What of the Illinois ox case where the trial court had refused to
hear the testimony of Ira Aldrich because he stated: “I don’t believe
that there is a Supreme Being who will reward and punish men . .
.”?168 The railroad appealed the exclusion of Aldrich on the basis of
his religious beliefs.
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by referring to
but not quoting the religious liberty provision of the Illinois
constitution: “The constitution (Art. 13, Sec. 3) has declared complete
toleration of all religions, and a freedom of conscience to every man to
worship as he may be enlightened and feel inclined . . . .”169 But, the
court continued, the constitution:
. . . has no provision that modifies the rules of the
common law in relation to requiring evidence in courts
being given upon oath. Nor has it changed the rules for
ascertaining those competent to give it.170
The Illinois constitution in effect at the time, the constitution of
1848, did contain two provisions arguably related to the exclusion of
Aldrich’s testimony on the basis of his religious beliefs. The Bill of
Rights provision cited by the court includes language “that no
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments
or modes of worship.”171 And the following section of the Bill of
Rights provides: “That no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any Office or public trust under this state.”172 The
court also noted that there was not an Illinois statutory provision on

167

Id. at 153.
Cent. Military Tract R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 544 (1856).
169
Id. at 552.
170
Id.
171
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 3.
172
See infra app. B.7.b.
168
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point.173
Having said that there were no applicable constitutional or
statutory provisions, the court moved to the common law rule. The
analysis began by noting the formulation of Lord Coke, which
excluded from testifying all non-Christians, describing it as “a rule as
narrow, bigoted and inhuman as the spirit of fanatical intolerance and
persecution which disgraced his age and country.”174
The court noted with approval Lord Hale’s formulation as:
. . . that all are competent who believe that there is a
God, the Creator and Preserver of all things, and that
He will punish them if they swear falsely, in this world
or in the next; and a want of such belief will render
them incompetent to take an oath, without which no
one can testify in a court of justice.175
The court did not explain why the Lord Hale formulation is not
as “narrow, bigoted and inhuman” as that of Lord Coke.
The court did claim that “there is great uniformity and
unanimity in the adoption and application of the rule, unchanged by
any constitution save that of Virginia, which secures religious
toleration and declares that men’s religion ‘shall in no wise affect,
diminish, or enlarge their civil capacities.’” 176 This statement is, of
course, factually incorrect. By 1856, when the Illinois opinion was
published, six states – including three of the five states contiguous to
Illinois – had constitutional provisions barring religious tests for
testimonial competency: Iowa (1846), New York (1846), Wisconsin
(1848), California (1849), Indiana (1851), and Ohio (1851).177
The Illinois court was of the opinion that the civil punishment
for perjury was insufficient: “A liability to civil punishment for

173

Rockafellow, 17 Ill. at 552.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 553.
177
See infra apps. D.2.a., 4.a., 5.a., 12.a., 14.a., and 19.a.
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perjury, and the fear of it, will not substitute that moral, conscientious
obligation under which witnesses are required to state facts as
testimony, and which is supposed to be imposed and exist by an oath
taken by one entertaining such belief.”178 Being ineligible to take the
oath, non-believers could not give testimony:
. . . one having no religion, believing in no God, and
not accountable to any punishment for falsehood, here
or hereafter, except his own notions of honor, veracity
and amenability to criminal justice, cannot be sworn, as
no legal, moral, conscientious obligation or
responsibility, in the view of the law, can be imposed
by an oath, and he may not testify without.179
The court sought to reassure that the exclusion of non-believers
from testifying was not an abridgement of their rights:
And this is no infringement of freedom of conscience,
or violation of constitutional tolerance. He may take
official oaths, and make ex parte affidavits, for no one
but a party interested can object to competency, and
that only to giving testimony against him; or, it may be,
to sit as a juror . . . and such acts as affect the rights of
others.180
On the basis of his religious beliefs, the Illinois Supreme Court
found Ira Aldrich incompetent to testify.181
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Rockafellow, 17 Ill. at 552.
Id. at 553–54.
180
Id. at 554.
181
Id
179

Vestal

2015]

LINGERING BIGOTRY

93

III. WHY OUGHT WE CARE?
. . . that we are, each of us, finite and imperfect people,
contending against others who are equally finite and
imperfect.182
Given the holding in Torcaso, it has been clear for fifty years
that religious tests for office will not be enforced at either the Federal
or state level. It must be equally clear that religious tests for
testimonial competence have no place under the First Amendment.
Why, then, should we be concerned about the eight state constitutions
that retain religious tests for public office, and the two of those eight
that also have religious tests for testimonial competency?
As to religious tests for both public office and testimonial
competency, it is hard to gauge the effects of the constitutional
provisions. One can look for cases in which the provisions were used
to attempt to exclude non-believers from public office or the
courtroom. As to the tests for public office, even pre-Torcaso there is
literally no record of any cases being brought to enforce these
provisions other than the test cases brought to challenge them. As to
tests for testimonial competency, there are only a very few reported
cases.
But perhaps the impact of the provisions was felt without
litigation; perhaps knowing of the provisions non-believers did not
seek public office and did not attempt to testify. The small number of
public non-believers into the mid-19th Century suggests that the
number of people who avoided public positions, or declined to testify,
because of the religious tests was exceedingly small.183 Nor is it clear

182

Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and
Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 75, 143 (2006). This is a Reinhold Niebuhr quotation, “finite and sinful men,
contending against others who are equally finite and equally sinful,” paraphrased to
be more inclusive. Reinhold Niebuhr, Zeal Without Knowledge, in BEYOND
TRAGEDY: ESSAYS ON THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 246 –47 (1937).
183
JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN
AMERICA 44 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986). With the caveat that the author is
referring to non-believers who publicly acknowledged their lack of belief, Notre
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that there would have been support among religious citizens to exclude
non-believers from office or from testifying.
Finally, it would have been relatively easy for many nonbelievers to avoid the operation of the provisions. Surely there have
always been what might be termed “professing non-believers,”
individuals who maintain the forms of outward rite of the dominant
religion even while acknowledging – at least to themselves – that they
do not believe. It can be assumed that many such professing nonbelievers would not have been deterred by the religious tests for public
office or for testimonial competency. They would have avoided the
religious tests by keeping their non-belief private.
Opposition to religious tests for public office and for witness
competency has always been grounded in the symbolic implications of
such provisions. The first concern is that the presence of such
religious tests, even if unenforceable, sends the message that the
government is prejudiced against a group of citizens based on religious
belief. By declaring non-believers unfit for public office or to testify,
the religious tests relegate them to second-class status. The prejudice
is heightened in situations, as in North Carolina, where the provision
reinforces the discriminatory message: the North Carolina language
groups “person[s] who deny the being of God” with “person[s] who
ha[ve] been adjudged guilty of treason or any other felony” and
“person[s] who ha[ve] been adjudged guilty of corruption or
malpractice in any office . . . .”184
A second concern is that the religious tests coarsen our national
Dame Professor James Turner observes that “. . . America does not seem to have
harbored a single individual before the nineteenth century who disbelieved in God.”
Id. (“If one disregards the expatriate [radical poet Joel] Barlow just before 1800 . . .
.”). Id. After the Civil War the situation changed:
Within twenty years after the Civil War, agnosticism emerged as a
self-sustaining phenomenon. Disbelief in God was, for the first
time, plausible enough to grow beyond a rare eccentricity and to
stake out a sizable permanent niche in American culture. Id. at
171.
Thereafter non-believe matured into a practical option: “By the 1880s, unbelief had
assumed its present status as a fully available option in American culture . . . it was
true that many Americans no longer believed in God. . . .” Id. at 262.
184
N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8.
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discussion of religion by acting as catalysts for religious bigotry.
Take, for example, the discussion surrounding Cecil Bothwell’s
election to the Asheville city council. It was perhaps not surprising
that arguments against Bothwell taking office started with the North
Carolina constitutional religious test for office, but the underlying
hostility of Bothwell’s critics toward non-believers was quite clear.
H.K. Edgerton cited the constitutional provision: “I’m not saying that
Cecil Bothwell is not a good man, but if he’s an atheist, he’s not
eligible to service in public office, according to the state
constitution.”185 But then he acknowledged his antipathy towards nonbelievers:
My father was a Baptist minister. I’m a Christian man.
I have problems with people who don’t believe in
God.186
Rather than an establishment or free exercise question,
Bothwell’s opponents attempted to cast the controversy as “a matter of
honoring the state constitution.”187 But here, too, the issue wound
back to Bothwell’s religious beliefs:
If you don’t like it, amend it and take out that clause.
But don’t just pick and choose what parts you’re going
to obey. This is serious business. I mean, the belief in
God is not exactly a quirk.188
Even at the Federal level, where the Constitution has always
contained a prohibition of religious tests for office, the suggestion of
such a test is the gateway for advocacy of discrimination based on
religious preference.
In August of 2014, the Air Force refused to allow a Technical

185

Boston, supra note 15.
Id.
187
Zucchino, supra note 13 (quoting David Morgan, editor of the conservative
weekly Asheville Tribune).
188
Id.
186
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Sergeant John Smith189 to reenlist solely because he struck the words
“so help me God” from a reenlistment form. A non-believer, Airman
Smith felt he could not truthfully sign the form with the included oath.
“The airman was told his only options were to sign the religious oath
section of the contract without adjustment and recite an oath
concluding with ‘so help me God,’ or leave the Air Force . . . .”190
An academic commentator was appropriately critical of the Air
Force’s position:
It is not only a violation of his constitutional rights
under the First Amendment but an offense to the many
atheists who have served and continue to serve our
country. . . . The refusal to accommodate the religious
beliefs of this service member is deeply disturbing and
contravenes core American values.
He should
challenge the rule . . . in federal court. He will then
doubly serve his country in standing against not just
enemies from without but those within our country who
refuse to respect the religious or non-religious views of
all citizens.191
Airman Smith challenged the rule.192 His argument, based on
two provisions of the United States Constitution, was both
straightforward and compelling. Article VI provides: “no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public

189

Not his real name, which was never publicly disclosed. The only disclosures
were that he is a man and a technical sergeant serving at Creech Air Force Base in
Nevada.
190
Stephen Losey, Group: Airman Denied Reenlistment for Refusing to Say ‘So Help
Me God,’ AIR FORCE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://archive.airforcetimes.com/article/20140904/NEWS05/309040066/GroupAirman-denied-reenlistment-refusing-say-help-me-God-.
191
Jonathan Turley, Air Force Bars Atheist From Reenlisting Unless He Signs and
Orally Repeats an Oath to God (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://jonathanturley.org/2014/09/10/air-force-bars-atheist-from-reenlisting-unlesshe-signs-and-orally-repeats-an-oath-to-god/.
192
E-mail from Monica Miller, Esq., Appignani Humanist Legal Ctr., to Office of
Inspector Gen., Air Force et al. (Sept. 2, 2014) (On file with Appignani Humanist
Legal Ctr.).
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Trust under the United States.”193 The First Amendment contains the
free exercise clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .
.”194 As the Supreme Court stated in Torcaso, the Federal government
cannot “constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion.’”195
The Air Force quickly backed down.196 Air Force Secretary
Deborah Lee James affirmed “[w]e take any instance in which Airmen
report concerns regarding religious freedom seriously,” announced the
Air Force was “making the appropriate adjustments to ensure our
Airmen’s rights are protected,” and confirmed airmen would be
allowed to reenlist without having to include the affirmation “so help
me God” in the process.197
Although the substantive issue was quickly decided in Airman
Smith’s favor, the suggestion of a religious test gave a patina of
legitimacy to the intolerance of differing religious views. For
example, one commenter thought Airman Smith’s refusal to swear a
religious oath made him unfit to serve.198 Another commenter

193

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
196
The Air Force policy had been the subject of a number of critical opinion pieces.
See, e.g., Allan Vestal, How Can Air Forces So Misread Constitution?, DES MOINES
REGISTER (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:10 PM),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/09/17/can-airforce-misread-constitution/15754039/.
197
Air Force Nixes ‘So Help Me God’ Requirement in Oaths, AIR FORCE TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2014, 6:06 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/17/air-force-nixes-so-help-megod-requirement-in-oaths/15802309/. In allowing members to omit “so help me
God,” the Air Force aligned its policy with those of the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps. Rachael Lee, ‘So Help Me God’ Made Optional in Air Force Enlistment
Oath, CHRISTIANITY DAILY (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:19 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/09/air_force_dumps_so_help_me_god.html.
198
Comment by wball, in US. Air Force Allows Scrubbing of “So Help Me God”
From Enlistment Oath, TOWNHALL.COM (Sept. 19, 2014 5:28 PM),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/09/19/us-air-force-scrubs-so-helpme-god-from-enlistment-oath-n1893214 (“What good is an oath if you haven't
sworn to someone or something. If the recruit feels he is unable to take the oath
properly, he is unfit to serve.”).
194
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grouped Airman Smith with “jihadists and unwanted/immoral
people,”199 yet another thought him an easy convert to Islamic
extremism:
I fear Atheists can be easy [to] convince to kill
Christians and even join ISIS, I do not trust Atheists,
they seems [sic] like they could kill and have no
remorse. They seems [sic] cold and not know [sic] real
deep love for others.200
Another thought Airman Smith would be dangerous to have in
the military:
I don’t want to be around anybody that won’t say Those
words, I have on the battle field enough years to know
it ain’t all about skill and superior fire power,
sometimes things just happen, I have found the ones
that don’t believe in GOD to be dangerous and just a
[sic] overall SH– Head. I’m not the most religious but I
do rely on GOD for a lot of Help from time to time
especially when bullets are trying to find me. More
times than I care to Count I’v [sic] seen men blown
apart still able to speak I can’t even begin to get a grip
on that, It has to be Devine Intervention, So why won’t
the bastards say So Help Me GOD WTF!!!201

199

Comment by Sourcecode-v14, in U.S. Air Force to Atheists: Declare God in Your
Enlistment Oath, or You Cannot Join the Air Force, SHOEBAT.COM (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://shoebat.com/2014/09/10/us-air-force-atheists-declare-god-enlistment-oathjoin-airforce/ (“‘One Nation Under G-D’ weather you like it or not. Doing things
like an Oath keeps jihadists and unwanted/immoral people from our armed
services.”).
200
Comment by DustyFae, in U.S. Air Force to Atheists: Declare God in Your
Enlistment Oath, or You Cannot Join the Air Force, SHOEBAT.COM (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://shoebat.com/2014/09/10/us-air-force-atheists-declare-god-enlistment-oathjoin-airforce/.
201
Comment by M24, in Oliver Darcy, The Four Words the Air Force Will Now
Allow Airmen to Omit From Their Enlistment Oaths, THE BLAZE, (Sept. 18, 2014,
7:38 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/09/18/the-four-words-the-airforce-will-now-allow-airmen-to-omit-from-their-enlistment-oaths/.
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Another commenter opined that non-believers cannot be
trusted:
I'm not going to get into a long diatribe here, but at
least in this country still exists some of the
fundamentals of our founding fathers in our military.
When we speak of God, Country, and Family that still
means something to many of us. Whether your God is
Jesus, Allah or your Big Book everyone of substance
should have one. When the atheists speak out they have
no foundation, and their lies are innumerous [sic]. They
would have all denouncing our creator and be damned.
So yes I absolutely support my US Airforce [sic] on
this decision because Atheists simply cannot be trusted
and we all know there are no Atheist in the foxholes.202
The director of issues analysis for the American Family
Association agreed with the Air Force’s initial, discriminatory
position:
The Air Force is doing exactly the right thing here.
There is no place in the United States military for those
who do not believe in the Creator who is the source of
every single one of our fundamental human and civil
rights. Serving in the military is a privilege, not a
constitutional right. And it should be reserved for those
who have America’s values engraved on their hearts . .
. . This is an absolutely foundational, non-negotiable,
bed-rock American principle: there is a Creator . . . and
he and he alone is the source of the very rights the
military exists to protect and defend. An individual
who does not understand and believe this has no right
to serve in the U.S. military. Military service should
rightly be reserved for those who believe in and are
willing to die for what America stands for – and what
America stands for is a belief in God as the source of

202

Comment by Michael Scott, in Stephen Losey, Atheist Must Swear To God – Or
Leave US Air Force, THE LIBERTY CRIER (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://libertycrier.com/atheist-must-swear-god-leave-us-air-force/.
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our rights . . . . Military service should be reserved for
genuine Americans – and genuine Americans, like the
Founders, believe in God.203
Televangelist Pat Robertson characterized the Air Force
decision to make the “so help me God” language optional as “crazy,”
and managed to inject what some would see as anti-Semitism into the
discussion:
There’s a left-wing radical named Mickey Weinstein,
who has got a group of people against religion or
whatever he calls it, and he has just terrorized the
armed forces. You think you’re supposed to be tough,
you’re supposed to defend us, and you got one little
Jewish radical who is scaring the pants off of you. You
want these guys flying the airplanes to defend us when
you got one little guy terrorizing them? That’s what it
amounts to. You know, we swear oaths, in the so help
me God. What does it mean? It means that with God’s
help. And you don’t have to say you believe in God,
you just say I want some help beside myself with the
oath I’m taking. It’s just crazy. What is wrong with
the Air Force? How can they fly the bombers to defend
us if they cave to one little guy? 204
Perhaps the most inappropriate statement in the public
discussion over Airman Smith’s re-enlistment came from a commenter
who prayed for the death of those responsible for the policies of the
Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps making the “so help me God”
oath optional to accommodate differences in religious belief among
recruits:

203

Bryan Fischer, No Atheist Should Be Permitted to Serve in the U.S. Military, ONE
NEWS NOW (Sept. 10, 2014) http://www.onenewsnow.com/perspectives/bryanfischer/2014/09/10/no-atheist-should-be-permitted-to-serve-in-the-usmilitary#.VEbGMovF_5E.
204
Dominique Mosbergen, Pat Robertson Learns Air Force Is Making ‘So Help Me
God’ Optional, Totally Freaks Out, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2014, 4:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/19/pat-robertson-air-force-so-help-megod_n_5851228.html.
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I have lost all respect for the Army, Air Force and
Marines. They have gone out of their way to
accommodate evil and alienate the very God they need
for protection in battle. To whom shall they turn now. I
pray the officers who worked this evil meet a deadly
fate on the battle field.205
Such statements, in some sense endorsed by state constitutional
religious tests for office, coarsen our national discussion at a time we
should be seeking reconciliation on matters of religion in our public
life.
Removing unenforceable state constitution religious tests
because of their symbolic effect is consistent with the effort to elevate
our national discussion involving matters of religion. In an article on
the Federal religious test clause, in which he argues – correctly, I think
– for a narrow reading of the third clause of Article VI in the context
of Federal judicial nominations, Professor Paul Horwitz calls for an
“etiquette of pluralism” in our use of religion in our public
discourse.206 Two of the guidelines he suggests, genuine respect and
humility, have application in the context of state constitutional
religious tests for office.
Professor Horwitz speaks of genuine respect in terms of
respect for religion:
One of the reasons that religion should not be excluded
from public discussion, or from the public square more
broadly, is that to do so fails to show genuine respect
for the vital role of religion in people’s lives, and for all
that it contributes to our public dialogue. Such policies
of exclusion are disrespectful to the religious

205

Comment by Publius, in Oliver Darcy, The Four Words The Air Force Will Now
Allow Airmen to Omit From Their Enlistment Oaths, THE BLAZE (Sept. 18, 2014,
9:08 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/09/18/the-four-words-the-air-forcewill-now-allow-airmen-to-omit-from-their-enlistment-oaths/. Evidently the author
was unaware that the Navy has the same policy in this regard as the Army, Air Force
and Marine Corps; presumably the author’s prayer would also extend to the
leadership of the Navy.
206
Horwitz, supra note 182, at 133–44.
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individuals who make up a substantial part of the
polity, and who wish to participate equally in our
political dialogue without being constrained to remain
silent about those values and motivations that drive
them the most deeply. To ask them to do so is more
than disrespectful; it is a form of violence.207
Surely Professor Horwitz would extend the call for respect to
encompass respect for non-believers. To include non-believers would
show genuine respect for the vital role of non-belief in some people’s
lives, and for all that non-religious critiques contribute to our public
dialogue. To exclude such points of view is disrespectful to the nonbelieving citizens who wish to participate equally in our political
dialogue without being constrained to remain silent about those values
and motivations that drive them the most deeply. To exclude such nonbelieving voices is more than disrespectful; it is a form of violence.
After all, Professor Horwitz acknowledges the prospect that the
presence of religion in our public dialogue will also bring about the
presence of criticism: “If religion is to enter into public dialogue, it is
appropriate to understand and expect that some criticism – hopefully
thoughtful, but quite possibly stringent nonetheless – will be mixed in
with the praise.”208
Which brings us to the other of Professor Horwitz’s guidelines
that applies: humility. As he observes, “. . . in our ‘world of multilingual discourse,’ in which both religious and non-religious
individuals engage each other in the public square, we ought always to
be conscious of our own limits, and strive to make our arguments with
‘humility and tolerance.’”209 It is a virtue that he would call upon both
the religious and the non-believer to exhibit.
. . . [I]n thinking about how each of us can engage in
religious talk in the public square, or how those of us

207

Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
Id.
209
Id. at 144 (quoting Daniel O. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious
Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J. L. &
RELIGION 337, 368 (1995–96).
208

Vestal

2015]

LINGERING BIGOTRY

103

who are non-religious can engage with religious ideas
in the public square, we might keep in mind a virtue
that one might hope always characterizes our efforts to
enter public dialogue: that of humility. Humility does
not counsel us to refrain from any religious or secular
judgments at all, or to disengage from the public square
altogether. But it reminds us that we are, each of us,
“finite and sinful men, contending against others who
are equally finite and equally sinful.”210
With the obvious caveat about inclusiveness, Professor
Horwitz is surely correct about the need for humility.
It would elevate our national discourse on matters of belief to
demonstrate genuine respect and humility by removing religious tests
for office and for testimonial competency from the state constitutions
of Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. There is some support for a
campaign to remove religious tests for office and testimonial
competency.211
What are the prospects for such a positive
development, and what would be the effect of attempts to remove the
religious tests failed?
Consider Arkansas, which has state constitution religious tests
for both public office and testimonial competency. What are the
prospects for removing the religious tests from the state constitution?
To start, the Arkansas constitution is relatively easy to amend; the
current 1874 constitution has been amended over eighty times.212 The
Arkansas constitution can be amended either by a measure passed by

210

Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
Laurie Goodstein, In Seven States, Atheists Push to End Largely Forgotten Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2014, at A23.
212
Franklyn C. Niles, Change and Continuity in Arkansas Politics after the 1874
Arkansas State Constitutional Convention, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF
AMERICAN STATES 251 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds.,
University of Missouri Press 2008), at 261 (“[T]he constitution, unlike in most
states, is easy to amend. Rather than supermajorities or approvals of two legislative
sessions, a simple majority in both chambers is sufficient.”); see also id. at 266 (“By
some estimates, only five other states have constitutions as easy to amend as
Arkansas[.]”)
211
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majorities in both houses of the legislature and by a majority of
voters,213 or by a measure initiated by ten percent of the voters and
passed by a majority of voters.214
But the amendment process has “pitted modernizers against
traditionalists in the state” in “the passage of amendment after
amendment in a desperate attempt to catch up to modernization.”215
The attempt, it is suggested, has not been successful: “. . . amending
the constitution has . . . failed to fully allocate social and political
rights . . .”216 The Arkansas constitution “reflects values shared by
most Americans: faith in God and belief in the sovereignty of God.”217
The challenge for removing the religious tests is suggested by the
experience in an earlier attempt to replace the 1874 constitution:
To further illustrate the importance of religion in
Arkansas government, it is noteworthy that opponents
to the proposed 1970 Arkansas state constitution argued
the document was “atheistic” because “Almighty God”
was removed from the bill of rights. In response to this
accusation, proponents reinserted the phrase in the
preamble, but the proposal was defeated nonetheless. . .
Clearly, the 1874 constitution, and the vision it
promulgates, is firmly rooted in the religiously
conservative soil of Arkansas’s political culture.218
The prospects for removing the Arkansas constitutional
religious tests for public office and testimonial competency are not
favorable, as was evidenced by a 2009 effort to repeal the Arkansas
provision.219 The constitutional amendment was introduced by

213

ARK. CONST. Art. XIX., §22, construed in Jewell, supra note 69, at 431.
Id.
215
NILES, supra note 212, at 252.
216
Id. at 268.
217
Id. at 256.
218
Id. at 257.
219
Radio Interview with Richard Carroll, Arkansas State Representative, at Ind. Pol.
Report (May 2009), available at http://www.blogtalkradio.com/ind-polreport/2009/05/10/richard-carroll-arkansas-state-representative; see also David
Waters, Atheist Revival in Arkansas, ONFAITH (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2009/02/13/an-advocate-for-atheists-in-ar/8289
214
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Representative Richard L. Carroll, a first-term member from North
Little Rock.220 The proposed amendment was the subject of
“considerable debate” with other members of the House before it was
introduced.221 Testimony was taken, but some non-believers were
reluctant to testify.222 Some legislators didn’t think the measure was
necessary: “. . . they feel like as long as no one is persecuted for those
beliefs and they are not kept from holding office or they are not kept
from testifying in court, that there is no need to address it in the
constitution.”223 Representative Carroll disagreed, looking at the
effect that the constitutional provision had on those against whom it is
directed:
But with it being there in the constitution it injects the
fear that will I be persecuted for seeking office and
being an atheist or will I be persecuted for coming to
testify in a courtroom and being an atheist. Those are
fears that are injected into individuals, and that was
what I was trying to address. Those individuals
shouldn’t have to go through those fears they should be
able to testify with a clear conscience and they should
be able to run for office if they want to run for office
with a clear conscience not worry about if I win and
this comes out will I be seated.224

(reporting on HJR 1009, to repeal the Arkansas constitution prohibition on atheists
holding office and testifying).
220
Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219 (noting Rep. Carroll, a
boilermaker by profession, was elected in 2008 on the Green Party ticket, making
him for a time the highest-ranking elected official of the Green Party in the nation.
He ran as a Green because of a situation involving the Democratic candidate which
arose too late to get Rep. Carroll on the ballot as a Democrat. At the conclusion of
the legislative session, he switched to the Democratic Party. Representative
Carroll’s biography on the Arkansas State Legislature site lists his “church
affiliation” as Catholic).
221
Id. (“[A]fter considerable debate with some individuals in the House I decided
that I would go ahead and bring it forward[.]”). Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219.
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The proposal was referred to committee, where it died.225
Representative Carroll explained the resistance on the part of other
members: “As far as the bill itself, they . . . being a southern, Biblebelt area, the right-wing legislators weren’t willing to go forward with
that piece because of . . . it could possibly go against their
constituents’ viewpoints.”226
Representative Carroll expected that there would be a political
price to pay for his advocacy of the constitutional amendment: “. . . I
decided that I would go ahead and bring it forward no matter what it
would do to me politically.”227 He was defeated in the next
Democratic primary by a margin of over sixty percentage points.228
IV. CONCLUSION
. . . religious toleration, in which this State has taken
pride, was never thought to encompass the ungodly.
Judge William L. Henderson
Maryland Court of Appeals
Torcaso v. Watkins229
As he was about to find out from Justice Black, Judge
Henderson was simply wrong about whether non-believers are owed
the protection of the Constitution:

225

Amending the Arkansas Constitution to Repeal the Prohibition against an Atheist
Holding an Office in the Civil Departments of the State of Arkansas or Testifying as
a Witness in any Court, H.R. 1009, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009).
226
Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219.
227
Id.
228
Statewide Results by Contest, ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE (June 18, 2010,
4:56 PM),
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/electionresults/index.php?ac:show:contest_statewide=1
&elecid=211&contestid=192 (2011); see also November 4, 2014 Arkansas General
Election and Nonpartisan Runoff Election Official County Results, ARKANSAS
SECRETARY OF STATE (last updated Nov. 14, 2014, 6:27 PM),
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/Pulaski/53298/147403/Web01/en/summar
y.html (showing Carroll losing the November 2014 election for District 14 by over
nineteen percentage points).
229
Torcaso, 162 A.2d at 443–44.
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can . . . force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs . . .230
Judge Henderson was also wrong to frame the question as one
of “religious toleration.” From the Second Great Awakening,
Americans have had a commitment to voluntarism and individual
competence, and to democracy, in matters of religious belief.
Voluntarism and individual competence mean that we expect
individual’s decisions on matters of religion to be voluntary and not
compelled.231
The necessary corollary of voluntarism is the
proposition that governmental compulsion ought have no role in
matters of religion or, as the Southern Baptist Convention so
eloquently stated it almost sixty years ago, the “aversion to any effort
to use the . . . powers of government to lay the weight of a feather
upon the conscience of any man in the realm of religion by privilege
or penalty.”232
The centrality of voluntarism and an absence of governmental
compulsion was nicely illustrated in a tract published in Boston in
1835 during the blasphemy trial of Abner Kneeland, the last man
imprisoned in the United States for blasphemy:
A religion that cannot withstand the force of argument,
the shafts of ridicule, and the thunder of invective – a
religion that requires for its support, the axe, the rack
and the faggot, has but weak claims to divinity, and is
hardly worth protecting at such cost. A religion

230

Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492–93 (quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
15–6 (1947)).
231
DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA, 1815-1848 188 (Oxford University Press 2007).
232
Resolution on Religious Liberty, SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION (last visited
Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/934/resolution-on-religious-liberty.
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founded upon coercion in this world, and upon menace
in the next, is surely but poorly calculated to soften the
heart, to chasten the feelings, or to increase, in the
aggregate, the sum of human felicity.233
Our commitment to voluntarism and individual competency
was accompanied by the democratization of religion:
The democratization of Christianity . . . has less to do
with the specifics of polity and governance and more
with the incarnation of the church into popular culture.
In at least three respects the popular religious
movements of the early republic articulated a
profoundly democratic spirit. First, they denied the
age-old distinction that set the clergy apart as a separate
order of men, and they refused to defer to learned
theologians and traditional orthodoxies . . . Second,
these movements empowered ordinary people by taking
their deepest spiritual impulses at face value rather than
subjecting them to the scrutiny of orthodox doctrine
and the frowns of respectable clergymen . . . [Third,]
Religious outsiders flushed with confidence about their
prospects, had little sense of their limitations . . . 234
A commitment to voluntarism and individual competence in
matters of religion carried with it the possibility that some individuals
would come to non-belief. A commitment to democracy required that
such individuals, even as to those who thought them in error, be
accorded equal treatment under the law as a matter of right, not grace.
Given our commitment to voluntarism and individual
competence, and to democracy, framing our approach to religious
liberty as one of toleration is inapt. As Baptist abolitionist and
religious liberty advocate John Leland declared in 1790: “the very idea
of toleration is despicable; it supposes that some have a pre-eminence

233

A COSMOPOLITE, A REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AGAINST ABNER KNEELAND
FOR BLASPHEMY 10 (Boston 1835).
234
NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 9–10
(Yale University Press 1989).
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above the rest, to grant indulgence; whereas, all should be equally free,
Jews, Turks, Pagans and Christians.”235 The right of the non-believer
to make decisions on matters of religion makes the concept of
toleration inapplicable, as Andrew Dunlap stated in his 1834 defense
of Abner Kneeland:
This is the boasted land of toleration. No, gentlemen,
that is not the proper word, for who shall presume to
tolerate another, when the latter has an undeniable right
to enjoy and maintain his own opinions? I should have
said this is the boasted land of civil and religious
freedom, guaranteed by written Constitutions of
Government, so plain that he who runs may read the
privileges which they secure, and the rights they
proclaim.236
In 1776, at a time when the constitutions of the emerging
American states were rife with religious discrimination, Virginia
adopted a Declaration of Rights provision on religion that charted a
very different direction:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator,
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only
by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and
therefore all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity
towards each other.237
Only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.
Genuine respect and humility. These noble sentiments are precisely
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why the six states that still have religious tests for public office in their
state constitutions – Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas – and the two states that have both
religious tests for public office and religious tests for testimonial
competency – Arkansas and Maryland – should remove them.
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Appendix A. State Constitutions with Religious Tests for Office.
1. Arkansas
a. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any
court.”).
b. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any
court.”).
c. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 21 (“No religious test or
amount of property shall ever be required as a qualification
for any office of public trust under this State. . .”).
d. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. VIII, § 3 (“No person who
denies the being of a God shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a
witness in any court.”).
2. Delaware
a. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (“Every person who shall
be chosen a member of either House, or appointed to any
office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering
upon the execution of his office, shall take the following
oath, or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking
an oath, to wit: ‘I _________, will bear true allegiance to
the Delaware State, submit to its constitution and laws, and
do not act wittingly whereby the freedom thereof may be
prejudiced.’ and also make and subscribe the following
declaration, to wit: ‘I _________, do profess faith in God
the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the
Holy Ghost, One God, blessed for evermore; and I do
acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old Testament and
New Testament to be given by Divine Inspiration.”).
3. Maryland
a. MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, art. 34 (“That
no other test or qualification ought to be required on
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of
office as may be prescribed by this Constitution, or by the
Laws of the State, and a declaration of belief in the
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Christian religion; and if the party shall profess to be a Jew,
the declaration shall be of his belief in a future state of
rewards and punishments.”).
b. MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, art. 37 (“That
no other test or qualification ought to be required, on
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of
allegiance and fidelity to this State, and the United States,
as may be prescribed by this Constitution; and such oath of
office and qualification as may be prescribed by this
Constitution, or by the laws of the State, and a declaration
of belief in the Christian religion, or in the existence of
God, and in a future state of rewards and punishments.”).
c. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 37 (“That
no religious test ought ever be required as a qualification
for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God . . .”).
4. Massachusetts
a. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. VI, art. I. (“Any person chosen
governor, lieutenant-governor, councilor, senator, or
representative, and accepting the trust, shall, before he
proceed to execute the duties of his place or office, make
and subscribe the following declaration, viz: ‘I, A.B., do
declare that I believe the Christian religion, and have a firm
persuasion of its truth; and that I am seized and possessed,
in my own right, of the property required by the
constitution as one qualification for the office or place to
which I am elected. . . .”).
5. Mississippi
a. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 6 (“No person who denies
the being of God, or of a future state of rewards and
punishments, shall hold any office the civil department of
this State.”).
b. MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, § 5 (“No person who denies
the being of a God, or of a future state of rewards and
punishments, shall hold any office the civil department of
this state.”).
c. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 23 (“No religious test, as a
qualification for office, shall ever be required, and no
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect
or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all religious
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sentiments, and the different modes of worship shall ever
be held sacred; Provided, The rights hereby secured shall
not be construed to justify acts of licentiousness, injurious
to morals, or dangerous to the peace and safety of the
State.”).
d. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 3 (“No person who denies
the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office in
this State.”).
e. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XIV, § 265 (“No person who
denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any
office in this state.”), but see Miss. Con. (1890), Art. III.,
§18 (“No religious test as a qualification for office shall be
required.”).
6. New Jersey
a. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (“That there shall be no
establishment of any one religious sect in this Province, in
preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant of
this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil
right, merely on account of his religious principles; but that
all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant
sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the
government, as hereby established, shall be capable of
being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a
member of either branch of the Legislature, and shall fully
and freely enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by
others their fellow subjects.”).
7. North Carolina
a. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 32 (“That no person who shall
deny the being of God, or the truth of the Protestant
religion, or the divine authority of either Old or New
Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles
incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State, shall
be capable of holding any office, or place of trust or profit,
in the civil department, within this State.”).
b. N.C. CONST. of 1835 (Amendments of 1835) art. IV, § 2
(“The thirty-second section of the constitution shall be
amended to read as follows: No person who shall deny the
being of God, or the truth of the Christian religion, or the
divine authority of the Old and New Testament, or who
shall hold religious principles incompatible with the
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freedom or safety of the State, shall be capable of holding
any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department
within this State.”).
c. N.C. CONST. of 1861 (Amendments of 1861-1862) § IX
(“Be it ordained by the delegates of the people of North
Carolina in Convention assembled, and it is hereby
ordained by the authority of the same, That the second
section of the fourth article of the amendments to the
Constitution shall be amended to read as follows: ‘No
person who shall deny the being of God, or the divine
authority of both the Old and New Testaments, or who
shall hold religious opinions incompatible with the freedom
or safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any
public office or place of trust or profit in the civil
department of this State.’”).
d. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art VI, § 5 (“The following classes of
persons shall be disqualified for office: First, All persons
who shall deny the being of Almighty God. Second; All
persons who shall have been convicted of treason, perjury
or any other infamous crime, since becoming citizens of the
United States, or of corruption, or malpractice in office,
unless such persons shall have been legally restored to the
rights of citizenship.”).
e. N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8 (“The following persons
shall be disqualified for office: First, any person who shall
deny the being of Almighty God. . . ”).
8. Pennsylvania
a. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10 (“. . . And each member, before
he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the following
declaration, viz: I do believe in one God, the creator and
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the
punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by
Divine inspiration. And no further or other religious test
shall ever hereafter be required of any civil officer or
magistrate in this State.”).
b. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4 (“That no person who
acknowledges the being of a God, and a future state of
rewards and punishments, shall on account of his religious
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sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”).
c. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 4 (“No person, who
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of
rewards and punishments, shall on account of his religious
sentiments be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this commonwealth.”).
d. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 4 (“No person who
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of
rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious
sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”).
e. PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 4 (“No person who
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of
rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious
sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”).
9. South Carolina
a. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. VI, § 2 (“No person who denies
the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office
under this Constitution.”); art. XVII, § 4 (“No person who
denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any
office under this Constitution.”).
10. Tennessee
a. TENN., CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 3 (“No person who
denies the being of God or a future State of rewards and
punishments shall hold any office in the civil Department
of this State.”).
b. TENN., CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 4 (“That no religious
test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office
or public trust under this State.”).
c. TENN., CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who
denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and
punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department
of this state.”), but see, TENN., CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 4
(“That no political or religious test, other than an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States and of this
state, shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under this State.”).
11. Texas
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a. TEX., CONST. of 1876, art. I, § 4 (“No religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office, or public
trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from
holding office on account of his religious sentiments,
provided he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme
Being.”).
12. Vermont
a. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX. (“. . . And each member,
before he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the
following declaration, viz. ‘I ___________ do believe in
one God, the Creator and Governor of the Diverse, the
warder of the good and punisher of the wicked. And I do
acknowledge the scriptures of the old and new testament to
be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the
protestant religion.’ And no further or other religious test
shall ever, hereafter, be required of any civil officer or
magistrate in this State.”).
b. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII. (“. . . And each member,
before he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the
following declaration, viz. You do believe in one God, the
Creator and Governor of the Diverse, the warder of the
good and punisher of the wicked.
And you do
acknowledge the scriptures of the Old and New Testament
to be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the
protestant religion. And no further or other religious test
shall ever, hereafter, be required of any civil officer or
magistrate in this State.”).
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Appendix B. State Constitutions with Prohibitions on Religious Tests
for Office.
Alabama
Ala. Const. of 1819, art. I, § 7.
Ala. Const. of 1861, art. I, § 7.
Ala. Const. of 1865, Art I, § 4.
Ala. Const. of 1875, art. I, § 4.
Ala. Const. of 1901, art. I, § 3.
Arizona
Ariz. Const. of 1912, art. II, § 12.
Arkansas
Ark. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 21.
California
Cal. Const. of 1849, art. XI, § 3.
Cal. Const. of 1880, art. XX, § 3.
Delaware
Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, § 2.
Del. Const. of 1831, art. I, § 2.
Del. Const. of 1897, art. I, § 2.
Georgia
Ga. Const. of 1861, art. I, § 7.
Ga. Const. of 1865, art. I, § 5.
Ga. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 6.
Ga. Const. of 1877, art. I, Par. XIII.
Ga. Const. of 1945, art. I, Par. XIII.
Ga. Const. of 1976, art. I, § I, Par. III.
Ga. Const. of 1983, art. I, § I, Par. IV.
Illinois
Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 4.
Ill. Const. of 1848, art. VIII, § 4.
Indiana
Ind. Const. of 1816, art. I, § 3.
Ind. Const. of 1851, art. I, § 5.
Iowa
Iowa Const. of 1846, art. II, § 4.
Iowa Const. of 1857, art. I, § 4.
Kansas
Kan. Const. of 1859, Kansas Bill of Rights, § 7.
Louisiana
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La. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 12.
Maine
Me. Const. of 1820, art. I, § 3.
Michigan
Mich. Const. of 1835, art. XII, § 1.
Mich. Const. of 1850, art. 18, § 1.
Mich. Const. of 1908, art. XVI, § 2.
Mich. Const. of 1963, art. XI, § 1.
Minnesota
Minn. Const. of 1857, art. I, § 17.
Missouri
Mo. Const. of 1820, art. XIII, § 5.
Mo. Const. of 1865, art. I, § 9.
Mo. Const. of 1875, art. II, § 5.
Mo. Const. of 1945, art. I, § 5.
Montana
Mont. Const. of 1973, art. III, § 3.
Nebraska
Neb. Const. of 1875, art. I, § 4.
New Jersey
N.J. Const. of 1844, art. I, § 4.
N.J. Const. of 1947, art. I, § 4.
New York
N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. VI, § 1.
N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. XII, § 1.
North Dakota
N.D. Const. of 1889, art. XI, § 4.
Ohio
Ohio Const. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3.
Ohio Const. of 1851, art. I, § 7.
Oregon
Ore. Const. of 1859, art. I, § 4.
Rhode Island
R.I. Const. of 1986, art. I, § 3.
South Dakota
S.D. Const. of 1889, art. VI, § 3.
Tennessee
Tenn. Const. of 1835, art. I, § 4.
Texas
Tex. Const. of 1845, art. I, § 3.
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Tex. Const. of 1866, art. I, § 3.
Tex. Const. of 1869, art. I, § 3.
Utah
Utah Const. of 1895, art. I, § 4.
Virginia
Va. Const. of 1830, art. III, § 11.
Va. Const. of 1971, art. I, § 16.
Washington
Wash. Const. of 1889, art. I, § 11.
West Virginia
W.Va. Const. of 1863, art. II, § 9.
W.Va. Const. of 1872, art. III, § 11.
W. Va. Const. of 1872, art. III, § 15.
Wisconsin
Wis. Const. of 1848, art. I, § 19.
Wyoming
Wyo. Const. of 1889, art. I, § 18.
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Appendix C. State Constitutions with Religious Tests for Witness
Competency.
1. Arkansas
a. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any
court.”).
b. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any
court.”).
c. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § 1 (“No person who
denies the being of a God shall hold any office in the civil
departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a
witness in any court.”).
2. Maryland
a. MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, art. 33 (“. . .
nor shall any person be deemed incompetent as a witness or
juror, who believes in the existence of a God, and that
under his dispensation such person will be held morally
accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished
therefor, either in this world or the world to come.”).
b. MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, art. 36 (“. . .
nor shall any person be deemed incompetent as a witness or
juror, who believes in the existence of God, and that under
his dispensation such person will be held morally
accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished
therefor, either in this world or the world to come.”).
c. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 36 (“no
person otherwise competent shall be deemed incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of his religious belief,
provided that he believes in the existence of God, and that
under His dispensation such person will be held morally
accountable for his acts, and will be rewarded or punished
therefor either in this world or the world to come.”).

